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I. INTRODUCTION
Viewed as a relic of a bygone era, modem legal teaching largely
ignores the Thirteenth Amendment. Few constitutional law textbooks
give it any more than a passing glance.' After all, slavery was abolished
in the United States in 1863.2 While it is true that some scholars have
suggested new applications for the Civil War Amendment 3 legal
practitioners have found few practical applications. This Article
proposes a real world application of the Thirteenth Amendment to a
current real world problem. Legal practitioners have under-utilized the
Thirteenth Amendment. They should employ the Thirteenth
Amendment as a valuable tool for fighting slavery and its modem-day
cousins. This Article shows how legal practitioners can use the
Thirteenth Amendment to protect immigrant garment workers from
exploitation.
There is a growing problem in the United States of immigrant garment
worker exploitation-or sweatshops. Sweatshops exist in every major
city in the United States and produce a large portion of the clothes that
are sold here today.4 The women who "work" in these factories are
I. See Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 1, 2 (1995) (noting exactly how many pages various constitutional law
textbooks devote to the Thirteenth Amendment).
2. President Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863.
See DONALD B. COLE, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN HISTORY 137 (1968).
3. See Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of
Abortion, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 480, 488-89 (1990) (claiming that abortion should be
legalized under the Thirteenth Amendment); Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor:
Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude and the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 207, 220-21 (1992) (suggesting that batterers, in effect, hold battered women
in involuntary servitude); Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as
Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359,
1360 (1992) (claiming that, under the Thirteenth Amendment, states would have a duty
to protect abused children who they know are being abused); Michelle J. Anderson,
Note, A License to Abuse: The hnpact of Conditional Status on Female Immigrants, 102
YALE L.J. 1401, 1428-29 (1993) (suggesting that women who remain married to abusive
husbands in order to avoid deportation are held in involuntary servitude); Neal Kumar
Katyal, Note, Men Who Own Women: A Thirteenth Amendment Critique of Forced
Prostitution, 103 YALE L.J. 791, 792 (1993) (suggesting that government officials who
fail to enforce laws against pimps are acting unconstitutionally under the Thirteenth
Amendment).
4. It is estimated that U.S. sweatshops manufacture as much as 50% of women's
clothing. Loam Jo Foo, The Vulnerable and Exploitable Immigrant Workforce and the
[VOL. 36: 397, 1999] Slaves to Fashion
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
often denied basic legal rights, such as minimum wage, overtime, and
health and safety protections They have seldom sought legal redress.6
Because many garment workers are illegal immigrants,7 their negotiating
powers are limited by the constant threat of deportation. In short, a legal
remedy needs to be found that will both prevent sweatshops from
occurring and, in the event they do occur, bring swift and severe
punishment to the parties involved.
In August 1995, California labor officials raided an apartment
complex in El Monte, California. Inside they found eighty Thai garment
workers held in virtual slavery. This Article employs the facts of the El
Monte case as a framework for testing the viability of the three-part
litigation strategy discussed below. Through the lens of the El Monte
case, this Article shows that the Thai garment workers could have
brought suit against the sweatshop owner, the companies that design and
distribute the clothing, and the federal government under the Thirteenth
Amendment. If they had done so, the impact on the industry would have
been immediate and lasting-sweatshops would have gone out of
fashion.
This Article proposes a three-part strategy to win restitution and
vindication for enslaved garment workers. The strategy seeks to deter
individuals from establishing sweatshops, to prevent garment
manufacturers, including clothing design companies and retailers with
their own clothing design lines, from contracting with sweatshops, and
to encourage the federal government to increase enforcement. It is an
attempt to hold accountable the three key parties who have contributed
to the infliction of involuntary servitude on garment workers. The
sweatshop owners themselves are the most obvious culprits. They are at
the helm of the shop, threatening the worker, locking the doors, and
paying minuscule wages. In many cases, the sweatshop owners recruit
Need for Strengthening Worker Protective Legislation, 103 YALE L.J. 2179, 2185
(1994).
5. The United States General Accounting Office (GAO) defines a sweatshop as a
business having just these sort of problems. See GAO, GARmENT INDUSTRY-EFFORTS TO
ADDRESS THE PREVALENCE AND CONDITIONS OF SWEATSHOPS, H.R. REP. No.
GAO/HEHS-95-29 (1994) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
6. Historically, only the government brought cases for wage and hour violations.
The only known case where the workers themselves sued is Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922
F. Supp. 1450 (C.D. Cal. 1996), which is discussed in detail infra Part II.
7. See Leo L. Lam, Comment, Designer Duty: Extending Liability to
Manufacturers for Violations of Labor Standards in Garment Industry Sweatshops, 141
U. PA. L. REV. 623, 632 (1992).
the women in their native countries, ship them to the United States, and
then confiscate their passports, while threatening them with deportation
for any insubordination.'
The sweatshop operators and their shops would not exist were it not
for the financial support of garment manufacturing companies who are
willing to place orders with them. If these companies were actually
concerned about the working conditions of the women who make and
assemble the clothing they design and sell, they would monitor the shops
and do business only with reputable dealers, those which abide by state
and federal laws. Unfortunately, because the apparel manufacturers
focus on the bottom line, the sweatshops flourish. Many manufacturers
are certainly aware that the money they pay for the finished product is
not sufficient to sustain a shop that operates in compliance with federal
and state labor laws.! It is for these reasons that a litigation strategy
targeting the manufacturers is imperative. Arguably, if such companies
had financial incentives to ensure that their producers comply with state
and federal laws, the incidents of sweatshops would decrease
substantially. Thus, this proposed litigation technique targets the source
of the funding.
The litigation strategy also targets a third party, the federal
government. While the federal government has very little direct impact
on sweatshops and garment workers, its inaction encourages the
sweatshops to flourish. The Thirteenth Amendment is unique in that it
commands that slavery be abolished.'0 The federal government is
mandated to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment. With greater and more




Although slavery no longer exists in its classic sense, there is a new,
almost as invidious, form of slavery still being practiced. The form has
changed-no longer are people bought and sold on an open market and
taken away in chains to labor without compensation on their master's
plantation. Modern-day slaves toil behind locked doors, at industrial
8. See Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint at 18-20, Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922
F. Supp. 1450 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (No. CV 95-5958) [hereinafter First Amended
Complaint].
9. See Bureerong, 922 F. Supp at 1460.
10. See Amar & Widawsky, supra note 3, at 1381-82.
400
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machines, in secret urban sweatshops. The principal difference between
modem slavery and that of the Civil War era is that today's masters
know slavery is illegal. They use uneducated, non-English speaking
laborers to ensure that their modem day plantations are not discovered."
Their slaves are unfamiliar with their rights under American law and
often feel grateful simply to have a job.'2 They are at the mercy of their
masters. Despite the passage of time, the eighty Thai garment workers
in El Monte, California had lives that differed little from the pre-Civil
War days. The women labored up to eighteen hours a day, seven days a
week. 3 They were paid less than sixty cents an hour.'4 They were held
captive in a renovated apartment building on a quiet residential street,
where as many as sixteen women shared one bedroom.'5 No one seemed
to notice that razor wire surrounded the building and guards patrolled the
grounds. 6
As with the African slaves of pre-Civil War days, escape was not a
real option. The El Monte immigrant workers claimed the owners
restrained them by threatening physical violence if they tried to escape. 7
As a warning to emphasize their point, the owners circulated a picture of
one of the women who had been beaten. 8 One of the victims, Sawieng
Singsathit, recalls being told that "[a] bullet is very cheap."' 9  The
workers also claimed that the owners told them that escape would result
11. See Lam, supra note 7, at 640. One law review article noted that the "closed,
family-type atmosphere" of the sweatshop increases the chances that the owner will
successfully conceal various labor law violations. See Barbara E. Koh, Note, Alterations
Needed: A Study of the Disjunction Between the Legal Scheme and Chinatown Garment
Workers, 36 STAN. L. REv. 825, 845 (1984).
12. See Lam, supra note 7, at 640.
13. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 8, at 4. The media estimates that the
women actually worked up to 20 hours a day. See All Things Considered (NPR radio
broadcast, Oct. 24, 1997).
14. The Washington Post reported that the women were paid approximately 60
cents an hour. See William Branigin, Sweatshop Instead of Paradise, WASH. POST, Sept.
10, 1995, at Al. National Public Radio reported that the women earned only 35 cents an
hour. See All Things Considered, supra note 13.
15. See Charles R. Chaiyarachta, Comment, El Monte is the Promised Land: Why
Do Asian Immigrants Continue to Risk Their Lives to Work for Substandard Wages and
Conditions?, 19 LoY. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 173, 175-76 (1996).
16. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 8, at 8; All Things Considered,
supra note 13.
17. See Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1459 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
18. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 8, at 8; All Things Considered,
supra note 13.
19. Branigin, supra note 14, at A12.
in harm to their families back in Thailand.20 To make escape even more
difficult, the owners censored the workers' mail and phone calls.2' They
had no unmonitored contact with the outside world.'
Unlike African slaves, the El Monte sweatshop owners did not buy or
sell the immigrant workers, but conned and duped them into a life of
involuntary servitude. The women claim that El Monte factory agents
approached them in Thailand. The El Monte agents allegedly told them
that if they agreed to come to the United States to work, they would earn
a significant amount of money, and would live and work under
acceptable conditions.2  The women came to America, as most
immigrants do, with a dream of making money and creating a better life
for themselves. However, when the immigrants arrived in the United
States, the El Monte owners confiscated their false passports, which the
El Monte operators provided, and put them to work in the factory. 4 In
addition, the sweatshop operators deducted the cost of the workers'
transportation to the United States from their pay' and forced them to
buy what little food they could afford at grossly inflated prices" Their
pay was so low, they could never be expected to pay off their "debt." 27
The women knew that they were being held illegally. As victim
Sawieng Singsathit told the press, "We used to see police cars pass by
and wonder, 'When are they going to come and help us?'... But
nobody ever paid any attention 
to us. ' '
.
The El Monte sweatshop began operating in 1988. It continued to
operate until a state raid on August 2, 1995.29 The central question is,
did the sweatshop simply go unnoticed, or was it ignored? The tragic
truth is that it was ignored. The Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) first learned about the sweatshop when an alleged escapee
anonymously called the Los Angeles Police Department in March of
1992. The caller claimed that forty-five workers were being held against
20. The victims believed the operators' threats because they knew that the
operators traveled frequently to Thailand to recruit more women. See First Amended
Complaint, supra note 8, at 22.
21. See Bureerong, 922 F. Supp. at 1459; First Amended Complaint, supra note 8,
at 8; All Things Considered, supra note 13.
22. See Bureerong, 922 F. Supp. at 1459; First Amended Complaint, supra note 8,
at 8.
23. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 8, at 31.
24. See Patrick J. McDonnell & Maid Becker, 7 Plead Guilty in Sweatshop Slavery
Case, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 10, 1996, at Al.
25. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 8, at 9; Bureerong, 922 F. Supp. at
1459.
26. See Bureerong, 922 F. Supp. at 1459-60.
27. See McDonnell & Becker, supra note 24, at A15.
28. Branigin, supra note 14, at A12.
29. See id.
402
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their will at the complex.0
On April 2, 1992, the INS initiated external surveillance procedures
on the El Monte complex. Agents monitored the complex, searched the
garbage, and used telescopes to observe any incriminating activities
within the complex.3 For four months, they periodically monitored the
premises. 32 Undoubtedly, what they saw was a sweatshop. They saw
clothing being made in a residential complex; they saw no movement in
and out of the complex, except for vans that brought in raw materials
and took out finished clothing. One agent reported in his affidavit that
he saw Asian women working around the clock at "industrial-type
sewing machines. 33  As the agent believed the complex contained
persons held in involuntary servitude, he requested a search warrant to
further inspect the premises.' His request contained the following
statement:
Based on my experience, I expect to find the following at 2614 Santa Anita
Ave.: approximately 45 aliens not lawfully present in the United States, one or
more persons holding these natives of Thailand, records of time pay and
production, passports[,] ... an45 receipts, invoices[,] or other evidence of
purchase or sale of... garments.
Surprisingly, the government denied the request for a search warrant.
The U.S. Attorney's Office has since claimed that there was "insufficient
'probable cause' for a criminal search warrant" and that the case under
the INS was closed.36
In 1995, the INS reopened the investigation when another alleged
escapee came forward. However, the INS and the U.S. Attorney's
Office determined that her information was "dated" and again refused to
seek a search warrant.3 For at least three years, the INS had knowledge
and evidence that women were being held in slave-like conditions and
30. See id.
31. See Robert Scheer, The Slave Shop and the INS' Indifference, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 8, 1995, at B9.
32. See Genevieve Buck, Retailers Investigated for Links to California Sweatshop,
SAN ANToio ExpREss-NEws, Aug. 11, 1995, available in 1995 WL 9497887.
33. Robert Scheer, Government Guilty of Slave-Factory Cover-Up, NMVs TRIB.
(Tacoma, Wash.), Aug. 10, 1995, at A14, available in 1995 WL 5370272.
34. See Robert Scheer, Why Did INS Drop Its Investigation of Thai Slave Shop?,
SAcRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 9, 1995, at B7.
35. Scheer, Government Guilty of Slave-Factory Cover-Up, supra note 33, at A14.
36. Branigin, supra note 14, at A12; see also McDonnell & Becker, supra note 24,
atA15.
37. Branigin, supra note 14, at A12.
did nothing to stop it."s
On June 28, 1995, the California Labor Department claimed to learn
for the first time about the possible existence of the El Monte
sweatshop. 9 The Labor Department began its own investigation,
secured a civil search warrant, and asked for a joint raid with the INS to
be scheduled on August 2. Initially the INS agreed and participated in
the planning of the raid. At the last minute, however, the INS withdrew
from the raid, claiming that going in under the state's warrant would
jeopardize their criminal case. They pulled out three dozen agents and
the Thai interpreters.4* The state proceeded with the raid as planned. In
the raid, the state discovered the sweatshop and rescued the women. A
few hours after the raid began, the INS appeared and arrested everyone,
including the victims who were taken in shackles to an INS detention
center. The government eventually released the workers on a $500
bond.4'
After seven years of being held in indentured servitude, three years of
which the government had full knowledge, the so-called Thai garment
workers received some measure of justice. In return for testifying in a
criminal investigation, the federal government allowed the victims to
remain legally in the United States.42 In 1996, the eight operators of the
El Monte sweatshop all plead guilty to charges of conspiracy, indentured
servitude, and harboring illegal immigrants. The courts sentenced the
convicted owners to prison terms ranging from two to seven years.
43
In addition to the criminal action, a coalition of civil rights groups
sued both the sweatshop operators and the retailers and manufacturers,
Mervyn's, Montgomery Ward, B.U.M., Internet, L.F. Sportswear, and
Miller's Outpost in federal court.44 The claims were brought under the
Thirteenth Amendment, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Racketeering
Influenced and Corrupted Organizations Act (RICO), state statutes
38. In addition to the INS' surveillance procedures, the complex was inspected by
El Monte building inspectors at least five times while in operation. See id.
39. See Wilson Slams Delays in Raid on Sweatshop; Blasts INS, U.S. Attorney, for
Not Acting More Quickly on Word of Slavery, S.F. EXAMnER, Aug. 25, 1995, at A5.
40. See Branigin, supra note 14, at A12.
41. See id.
42. Telephone Interview with Dan Tokaji, ACLU of Southern Cal. (Nov. 4, 1997).
43. See George White & Patrick McDonnell, Sweatshop Workers to Get $2
Million, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1997, at Dl. The court sentenced Suni Manasurangkun,
the manager, to seven years in jail. The court imposed a six-year prison term on each of
Manasurangkun's sons, Wirachi, Surachai, and Phanasak. The court convicted an
accomplice, Suporn Verayutwilai, for conspiracy and imposed a five-year prison
sentence. The court sentenced Sunthon Rawangchaison, a hired guard, to six years. The
court also imposed a four-year prison sentence on Rampha Satthaprasit, another
manager, and a two-year prison term on Seri Kanchakphairi, another guard. See
McDonnell & Becker, supra note 24, at A15.
44. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 8, at 9.
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prohibiting false imprisonment, extortion, unfair business practices, and
state statutes establishing minimum wage and maximum hour laws."
The complaint alleged that the workers were held in indentured
servitude. The complaint also alleged that the sweatshop operators
restrained the workers "through the use of physical force, express and
implied threats of physical force, and threats of harm to their families if
they attempted to escape. '
A suit against the clothing design companies and retailers was a new
tactic. Because the sweatshop operators were facing criminal sanctions
and were arguably judgment proof, the plaintiffs knew that their one
chance for restitution was to go after the companies that designed and
distributed the garments. After all, the El Monte sweatshop-
manufactured clothing was sold in stores such as Macy's, Robinsons-
May, and Filene's.47 The plaintiffs reasoned that the retail companies
realized their profits, in part, by contracting for goods produced in a
sweatshop. As plaintiffs' attorney Julie Sue noted, "[it] doesn't matter if
you didn't know.... If you create the conditions for enslavement or for
sweatshops, and then you walk away, you're still responsible."'48 In their
complaint, the plaintiffs claim that the defendant retailers knew that they
had contracted with the sweatshops to produce their brand of garments at
such a low price that it would be impossible to pay employees minimum
wages and overtime and that the entire system, under which the clothing
manufacturers contract out their work, exists to avoid liability for failure
to comply with labor laws.9
Under the Thirteenth Amendment they sued only the sweatshop
operators. They claimed extreme mental suffering, humiliation,
emotional distress, physical injuries, and economic losses. They asked
in the complaint for damages of no less than $10,000 per plaintiff, per
day of unlawful confinement.5 In the end, the manufacturers settled the
case out of court for more than four million dollars.5 ' The manufacturers
45. See id. at 4.
46. Id. at 7-9.
47. See White & McDonnell, supra note 43, at DlI. Boxes were found on the
premises with shipping labels addressed to Mervyn's and Montgomery Ward, and
clothing was found with Macy's, Hecht's and Filene's labels. See Genevieve Buck,
Prison Camp Sweatshop Probe Widens; Wards, Mervyn's, Macy's, Other Retailers to
Face Questioning, Cm. TRM., Aug. 10, 1995, at N1.
48. All Things Considered, supra note 13.
49. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 8, at 11-12.
50. See id. at 14-15.
51. See K. Connie Kang, Final $1.2 Million Added to Thai Workers' Settlement,
admitted no liability.52
Because the facts of the El Monte case were so egregious, it received
substantial media coverage. The coverage led to political grandstanding
about the evils of sweatshop labor. Immediately after the El Monte
sweatshop was "discovered," the government increased funding and
staffing levels for the INS, but the number of raids after El Monte
(approximately 1,000) was still significantly lower than the 5,000 raids
conducted in the early 1990s and 1980s, when there were fewer
contractors in the garment business. 3 The White House established a
task force on apparel manufacturing, which was to design a code of
conduct for clothing companies and retailers to root out sweatshops. 4
Yet, the sweatshop problem persists.
B. Sweatshops in General
Admittedly not all sweatshops are as reprehensible as the El Monte
sweatshop, however, they still exploit a vulnerable element of our
society.5  Garment workers are typically female illegal aliens of
Hispanic or Asian descent. 6 Naturally their illegal status makes them
extremely susceptible to exploitation.5 7 If the garment workers try to
organize for better conditions, their employers can call the INS5 8
Constantly threatening workers with deportation allows sweatshop
owners to take advantage of the workers' precarious situation. A
reporter, who went under cover for three months in a garment
sweatshop, found that while employee time cards reported forty-hour
work weeks, employees actually worked twelve-hour days, six days a
week.59 The reporter also found that the company he investigated
retained few records of payments to workers and usually paid the
L.A. TIMES, July 29, 1999, at Al.
52. See id.
53. See Don Lee, Task Force in Tatters; State-Federal Tensions Hinder Garment
hIdustry Crackdown, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1996, at DI.
54. See White & McDonnell, supra note 43, at Dl.
55. As one article noted, "'[o]ther than unabashedly illegal enterprises, [the
garment industry] is by all accounts the most lawless industry."' Dennis Hayashi,
Preventing Human Rights Abuses in the U.S. Garment Industry: A Proposed Amendment
to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 195, 197 (1992) (citing Mark
Thompson, Theadbare Justice, CAL. LAW., May 1990, at 30).
56. See Lam, supra note 7, at 632; GAO REPORT, supra note 5.
57. "Immigrant women constitute one of the groups most vulnerable to
exploitation in our society, yet their needs remain unaddressed [sic] by the legal system."
Anderson, supra note 3, at 1428.
58. See Farhan Haq, United States: Critics Link Immigration Laws to Sweatshops,
INTER PRESS SERV., Mar. 26, 1996, available in 1996 WL 9809605.
59. See Lam, supra note 7, at 634 n.108.
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workers in cash without withholding taxesW The sweatshop was usually
"damp and hot, cramped with piles of highly flammable materials,
poorly lit, with blocked exits, battered doors, and gnme-Goated
windows; it was generally unsafe and unsanitary."6' In a 1994 report, the
United States General Accounting Office (GAO) found that many shops
had exposed wiring, unsanitary bathrooms, lack of machine safety
guards, blocked aisles, poor lighting, lack of temperature control, and
lack of ventilation.62 The report found that sweatshop conditions had
changed little from those at the turn of the century.63
The country's three largest apparel production areas are Los Angeles, 6'
New York City,6 and San Francisco. 6 Overall, more than one million
people work in the U.S. garment industry, which is dominated by small
shop operations.67 The GAO defines a sweatshop owner as "an employer
that violates more than one federal or state labor law governing
minimum wage and overtime, child labor, industrial homework,
occupational safety and health, workers' compensation, or industrial
registration. Sweatshop owners most frequently violate labor laws
that protect minimum wages, overtime pay, and place restrictions on
child labor.69 The GAO identified three primary factors that have led to
the proliferation of sweatshops in the United States: the presence of a
large immigrant community desperate for work, the labor intensity and
low-profit margins of the work, and the rapid growth of subcontracting. 0
In a 1995 spot test, agents from the U.S. Department of Labor
60. See id.
61. Id. at 633-34 (footnotes omitted).
62. See GAO REPORT, supra note 5.
63. See id.
64. Los Angeles is the largest garment producing area with more than 140,000
workers in 5,000 shops. See Patrick J. McDonnell, Marchers Protest Garment
Sweatshop Labor, L.A. TiMEs, Oct. 5, 1997, at BI. But see Bob Baker, Union Targets
Sweatshop Operators, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1990, at B3 (reporting that the number of
garment workers is 90,000). Arguably, a precise count is impossible due to the secretive
nature of most shops.
65. Approximately 6,000 garment shops operate in New York City. See Lam,
supra note 7, at 634.
66. A five-billion-dollar-a-year garment industry employs approximately 10,000
San Francisco-based workers. The majority of these San Francisco-based workers are
Chinese immigrant women. See id. at 627 n.29.
67. See id. at 628.
68. Id.
69. See Lam, supra note 7, at 633.
70. See GAO REPORT, supra note 5; see also Foo, supra note 4, at 2185
(discussing the garment industry pyramid-like subcontracting structure).
investigated fifty registered Los Angeles garment manufacturing
operations and discovered wage and overtime violations at forty-six of
them. The investigators also determined that the garment shop operators
improperly withheld more than $500,000 from approximately 600
employees' collective wages." If such labor law violations occurred in
legally registered garment production shops, one can only imagine what
occurs in the unregistered shops. This concept is even more alarming
when one considers that the GAO reports that sweatshop operations have
been increasing throughout the 1990s.72 Estimates indicate that
approximately fifty percent of women's apparel made in America is
produced in sweatshops.73
Historically, U.S.-based clothing companies manufactured the
majority of garments bought and sold in the United States. In fact,
during the 1950s, only four percent of the clothing purchased in the
United States was made abroad. 4 In the 1960s and 1970s, however,
domestic manufacturing companies began moving their operations
abroad, seeking out cheaper labor forces located predominately in Asia
and South America. By the late 1980s, over sixty percent of the "name-
brand garments" sold in the United States were manufactured abroad and
imported.7 ' The U.S. garment industry, however, has recently reversed
the trend. Companies are moving their operations back to the U.S. due
to several factors, including unstable political climates in foreign
countries, increases in U.S. import duties, significant decreases in
product quality, and increased demand for higher wages abroad. In turn,
these factors have significantly contributed to the substantial increase in
U.S.-based garment workers.76
Unfortunately, many of these garment workers tolerate the harsh
working conditions of illegal sweatshops because they are "accustomed
to third-world working conditions."77  The illegal sweatshops are
typically located in the immigrant communities, 8 where the residents
commonly speak little English. Despite the unhealthy conditions under
which they labor, immigrant sweatshop workers often feel lucky to have
71. See James Sterngold, Agency Missteps Put Illegal Aliens at Mercy of
Sweatshops, N.Y. TmInEs, Sept. 21, 1995, at A16.
72. See GAO REPORT, supra note 5.
73. See Foo, supra note 4, at 2185.
74. See Hayashi, supra note 55, at 196.
75. See id. at 196-97.
76. See id. at 197.
77. Lam, supra note 7, at 639. In fact, the average garment worker in Bangkok,
Thailand earns between $3.35 and $6.07 a day for a workday that can last up to 16 hours.
See Chaiyarachta, supra note 15, at 173-74.
78. See Lam, supra note 7, at 623.
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any job at all." They are at the mercy of the shop owners. They do not
complain for fear that such complaints will result in their dismissal or
will lead government officials to shutdown the shop and order the illegal
immigrant workers deported."0 As one worker in New York's garment
district told a reporter, "We know we should be paid the minimum wage,
we know we should be paid overtime, but what can we do?... If we
complain about not getting overtime, if we ask for days off, they can
always find someone else.""1 Similarly, garment workers interviewed in
San Francisco's Chinatown claimed that the protection of labor laws and
minimum wages were reserved for white Americans.82
The subjugation of these immigrant garment workers has been
facilitated by recent legislative action. By passing tougher immigration
laws, Congress has unintentionally allowed sweatshops to flourish. In
an ever more precarious position, illegal immigrants in the United States
have become increasingly desperate for work, and much more frightened
to report violations." The 1986 passage of the Immigration Reform and
Control Act," which increases penalties for hiring undocumented
workers, was said to have "sparked a resurgence of sweatshops.""5
However, the threats of increased penalties for hiring illegal workers can
increase their employers' power over them.86  Employers hire
undocumented immigrants knowing that these workers will not risk
deportation to report labor law violationsYn Wing Lam, Executive
Director of the Chinese Staff and Workers Association, an immigrant
rights group in New York City, stated that, "People are afraid they'll be
deported. They have nowhere to go. It's like they're working on
plantations."88
79. See id. at 640.
80. See id.
81. Aurelio Rojas, Border Guarded, Workplace Ignored, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 18,
1996, at Al.
82. See Koh, supra note 11, at 844.
83. See Haq, supra note 58.
84. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (1994 & Supp. 1111997).
85. Haq, supra note 58.
86. See id.
87. See Foo, supra note 4, at 2183.
88. Rojas, supra note 81, at A6. It is hard to identify with the immigrant workers'
fear of being deported. It seems that deportation would be better than being subjected to
slave-like conditions. However, immigrant women often subject themselves to physical
abuse rather than risk deportation if they report their batterer. See Anderson, supra note
3, at 1421-22. Similarly, a study of undocumented immigrants found that for 64% of
Latinas and 57% of Filipinas, the primary barrier to seeking help from any sort of social
The INS has facilitated the maintenance of the sweatshop system by
focusing on border patrols rather than on employers. Despite the fact
that half of the illegal immigrants who enter the United States come
legally on visas and simply overstay; in 1995, the INS had fifteen times
the amount of border patrol officers as workplace agents.89
Ill. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT: AN OVERVIEW
The Thirteenth Amendment is viewed as ancient history in modem
constitutional theory. Most constitutional scholars disregard the
Thirteenth Amendment as having outlived its usefulness. But the
Thirteenth Amendment was intended to do more than simply free the
slaves after the Civil War. The amendment was a "promise of 'universal
civil and political freedom."' 9' It was intended to bestow upon all
second-class members of our society the right to be equal.
There are two sections in the Thirteenth Amendment. The first
section92 prohibits slavery or involuntary servitude. The second section93
grants Congress the power to enforce the amendment through legislative
action. The latter section gives Congress the right to redress the badges
and incidences of slavery.
Irrespective of its creators' intent, the Thirteenth Amendment has
largely been reduced to the narrowest of possible interpretations-the
simple abolishment of slavery.94 According to the legislative history of
the amendment, Congress had three primary purposes behind its
enactment. First, Congress intended the amendment to remove "the
shackle... from the limbs" of the enslaved. Second, Congress intended
the amendment to extend rights to African Americans both enslaved and
free. Third, Congress sought to broaden constitutional rights for all
Americans.95
services agency is the fear of being deported. See id. at 1421 n.127 (citing CHRIS
HOGELAND & KAREN ROSEN, DREAMs LOST, DREAMS FOUND: UNDOCUMENTED WOMEN
IN THE LAND OF OPPORTUNITY 17 (1991)).
89. See id.
90. "Most constitutional law professors view the Amendment as having historical
meaning only and thus overlook the link between the abolition of slavery and current
human rights issues." Colbert, supra note 1, at 2 (footnote omitted).
91. Id. atl.
92. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or
any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
93. "Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
94. See Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138
U. PA. L. REv. 437, 503 (1989).
95. Colbert, supra note 1, at 10 (footnote omitted). Massachusetts Senator Henry
Wilson stated that the Amendment was to "obliterate the last lingering vestiges of the
410
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After its passage, the Thirteenth Amendment did not meet many of its
proponents' expectations.' 6 As one Congressman declared in the debate
that followed its passage, "What is freedom? Is it the bare privilege of
not being chained?... If this is all, then freedom is a bitter mockery, a
cruel delusion."" To counteract the narrow construction the states were
giving the amendment, Congress, pursuant to its privilege under the
second section of the amendment, passed the 1866 Civil Rights Act. 8
Through this Act, Congress guaranteed citizenship to all U.S.-born
people, except Native Americans.9 The Act identified the fundamental
rights that were to be recognized in order for all men to be equal before
the law. The 1866 Act specified the right to contract, the right to own
property, the right to have access to the courts, and basic equality before
the law. '0°
The congressional debate surrounding the 1866 Civil Rights Act was
similar to a debate typically waged in the courts. In considering the
necessity of the bill, congressional members argued in specific terms
what they had meant when they passed the Thirteenth Amendment.
They were, in effect, debating the meaning of their own legislative
history. Proponents of the bill claimed that the Thirteenth Amendment
was to make former slaves and all African Americans "freem[e]n...
entitled to those rights which we concede to a man who is free."'0 ' As
one proponent noted, "When I voted for the amendment to abolish
slavery... I did not suppose I was offering [African Americans] a mere
paper guarantee."' °2  Despite passage of the Thirteenth Amendment,
former slaves remained on the plantation laboring for their masters. The
only change that occurred was that the slaves were paid ridiculously low
slave system; [it will allow] the wronged victim of the slave system [and] the poor white
man... impoverished, debased, dishonored by the system that makes toil a badge of
disgrace... [to] begin to run the race of improvement, progress, and elevation." Id. at
10 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1324 (1864)).
96. In fact, the passage of the Amendment was met with violence against African
Americans in the South. See Colbert, supra note 1, at 11-12.
97. JAMES A. GARFIELD, THE WORKS OF JAMES ABRAM GARFIELD, 1:86 (Burke A.
Hinsdale ed., 1970); see also Colbert, supra note 1, at 14 n.76.
98. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was the precursor to 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988).
See Akhil Reed Amar, Comment, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 106 HARv. L. REv. 124, 157 (1992).
99. See Colbert, supra note 1, at 13.
100. See id.
101. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 405 (1866).
102. Colbert, supra note 1, at 13 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1151
(1866) (statement of Rep. Thayer).
wages. As Senator Jacob Howard noted, "by compelling [the former
slave] to labor at such price as the old master may see fit to pay him,
while at the same time, he not being a slave, has no claim whatever upon
that old master for support," puts the former slave in a worse position
than prior to emancipation.' 3 On the other hand, opponents of the bill
said that the Thirteenth Amendment was meant simply to liberate slaves
from their masters. 4 The Civil Rights Act was intended to restore the
vision of the amendment's framers as a guarantee of liberty to freed
slaves and was eventually passed over President Andrew Johnson's
veto.05
A. Thirteenth Amendment Case Law
Just as there are two sections to the Thirteenth Amendment, there are
two lines of Thirteenth Amendment case law. Under the second section,
the courts were for a long while reticent to recognize anything as a
"badge or incident" of slavery.' 6 While the Court during the Warren
103. VanderVelde, supra note 94, at 480.
104. See id.
105. See COLE, supra note 2, at 139.
106, Despite its potential, the Thirteenth Amendment was reduced soon after the
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to simply outlawing human bondage. In the
landmark Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), white butchers in
Louisiana sued to overturn a Louisiana law that granted a monopoly to a slaughter-house
corporation and denied the plaintiffs the use of their own land and property to pursue
their chosen profession. See id. The butchers claimed that this law violated the
Thirteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court held that the Thirteenth Amendment simply
abolished chattel slavery. See id. at 69. In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the
Court overturned the 1875 Civil Rights Act which outlawed race discrimination in public
accommodation and jury selection. See id. at 20-21, 25. Again, the Court held that
slavery was one person owning another. See Colbert, supra note 1, at 23. The Court
reasoned that because race discrimination did not affect the exercise of legal rights by
free African Americans, such discriminatory acts were not "badges and incidents of
slavery." The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20. The Amendment was to be limited to
"[c]ompulsory service of the slave for the benefit of the master." Id. at 22. This holding
negated Congress's ability to pass anti-discrimination laws under the Thirteenth
Amendment.
In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), Justice Harlan tried to revive the
Thirteenth Amendment, finding in his dissent that the Thirteenth Amendment was
intended to eliminate the burdens and disadvantages of slavery, of which separate
railway cars were one. See id. at 551 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
It was not until the last day of the Warren Court that the Supreme Court revived the
Thirteenth Amendment. See Colbert, supra note 1, at 28. In the landmark case, Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), the Court held for the first time that a private
individual's refusal to sell a home to an African American family was prohibited under
the Thirteenth Amendment, because the inability to own property was one of the primary
badges of slavery. See id. at 441. Because it was tied to the badges of slavery, Congress
had the power to prohibit such conduct under section 2 of the Amendment. It was under
this authority that Congress was able to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which
prohibited discrimination in property transactions. See id.; Colbert, supra note 1, at 2.
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years eventually did hold a discriminatory act to be a badge or incident
of slavery, litigation under section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment is not
directly at issue in a case such as the garment workers in El Monte.
This Article focuses on section 1 litigation. The relevant question
litigated under section 1 is the scope of the definition of involuntary
servitude. Historically, litigation regarding the first section of the
Thirteenth Amendment flourished as the Court struggled to define what
involuntary servitude meant and to whom it applied." The Court
quickly dispelled the notion that the Thirteenth Amendment was
applicable only to Africans and their decedents. In the Slaughter-House
Cases,' despite finding against the white butchers, the Court held that
the Thirteenth Amendment did not discriminate on the basis of race.'"
"Undoubtedly while negro slavery alone was in the mind of the
Congress which proposed the [T]hirteenth [A]rticle .... [i]f Mexican
peonage or the Chinese coolie labor system shall develop slavery of the
Mexican or Chinese race within our territory, [the Thirteenth
A]mendment may safely be trusted to make it void.." The Court
continued to reiterate this point in the Civil Rights Cases,"' declaring
that the Thirteenth Amendment made no distinctions on the basis of
race, class, or color, but addressed slavery." 2 Again, in 1906, the Court
held that "[s]lavery or involuntary servitude of the Chinese, of the
Italian, of the Anglo-Saxon are as much within [the Thirteenth
Amendment's] compass as slavery or involuntary servitude of the
African.""
' 3
In addition to the Court's conclusion that the Thirteenth Amendment
With this single case, the Supreme Court breathed life into the dormant Thirteenth
Amendment. While the Supreme Court has done little with this line of case law since
Jones, it recently reaffirmed its decision. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164, 176 (1989).
107. The Court has recognized several exceptions to the Thirteenth Amendment's
absolute decree. The Thirteenth Amendment, despite the frequent litigation attempts,
does not prohibit the military draft, pretrial detention of a material witness to a trial, and
civic duty laws that require work service or payment. See 45 AM. JUR. 2D Involuntary
Servitude & Peonage § 12 (1999); see also Koppelman, supra note 3, at 489 (discussing
whether "labor" applies to pregnancy, childbearing, and domestic duties).
108. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
109. See id. at 72.
110. Id.
111. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
112. See id. at 24 (pointing out that it is the Fourteenth Amendment that extends its
protections on the basis of race and class, whereas the Thirteenth Amendment simply
abolishes slavery).
113. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 17 (1906).
does not discriminate on the basis of race, the legislative history of the
amendment reveals that the framers were concerned not only with the
African slave but also with northern labor practices."'4 The members
voiced concerns that the northern worker, unlike even the slaves, had no
job security and was not provided for by his employer in the case of
illness or injury. As southerners had noted during the anti-slavery
debate, many congressmen believed that slavery was often more
merciful than northern labor practices."
5
The definition of involuntary servitude has raged in the courts since
the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment. Generally, the debate has
swung between those who wish to limit the definition of involuntary
servitude to "the use or threatened use of physical or legal coercion,"
' 6
and those who wish to recognize that involuntary servitude can be
psychologically enforced when the individual has or believes they have
"no way to avoid continued service or confinement."' 7 Both sides of the
debate have traditionally agreed that the words "involuntary servitude"
encompass more than the term slavery."'
The courts have struggled with many instances of plaintiffs asserting
Thirteenth Amendment violations in cases that bear little resemblance to
the days of slavery. Recently in Mack v. United States,"9 one of the
plaintiff-sheriffs contended that the Brady Act's provision compelling
local law enforcement officers to complete background checks on all
gun applicants violated his Thirteenth Amendment rights in that the Act
forced him to perform an additional duty without pay.'20 As the Ninth
Circuit held, involuntary servitude cannot exist unless the individual has
no other work options, including the option to quit.' Because the
sheriff in that case could easily quit, with no adverse consequences to his
personhood, he was not being held in involuntary servitude.l 2 Hence,
the crux of a civil slavery claim is to provide evidence that the coercion
under which the plaintiff labors cannot be avoided by simply quitting his
job.
114. See VanderVelde, supra note 94, at 486-87.
115. See id. at 486 (stating that Southerners' paternalism benefited slaves by
providing for the slaves' needs in old age or when there was little work, whereas
northern employers simply fired employees when they were no longer useful).
116. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 944 (1988).
117. United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 486 (2d Cir. 1964).
118. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219,241 (1911).
119. 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995).
120. See id. at 1034.
121. See id.
122. See id.
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IV. LEGAL STRATEGIES UNDER THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
The U.S. garment industry is a multi-billion-dollar industry. Except
for the garment worker, every participant in the complicated web of
employers, contractors, and subcontractors is trying to get a piece of the
"action." With so many people fighting to make a profit, the workers
have fallen by the wayside. This Article's objective is to identify a
litigation strategy that will provide relief to enslaved garment workers
and will also provide an incentive for the government to prevent such
enslavement.
Employers in labor-intensive industries, such as the garment industry,
commonly violate labor laws regulating minimum wage and overtime.' 3
While the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)14 is a viable enforcement
method, it falls short in several key areas. First, FLSA fails to exact a
high enough penalty on the sweatshop operators. In 1997, federal
investigators determined that almost two-thirds of the manufacturers in
the New York City garment district violated minimum wage and
overtime laws.' s In 1990, California Department of Industrial Relations
officials inspected approximately 1,700 Los Angeles garment shops and
issued citations to eighty-six percent for violating labor laws.'26
Although the inspectors imposed $1.7 million in fines,'2 shop operators
only paid a fraction of these fines in full. Even when labor laws are
enforced, 1" the amount of money that each shop operator pays is often
minimal. While the INS issues citations with significant fines to shops
that employ illegal immigrants, the shop operators frequently argue, and
win, at the agency level to have the fines reduced.'29 Apparently, the
only effect that labor law citations have on shops is to cause some of
them to close; most shops simply consider the fines a cost of doing
business.'3 ° Simple citations do not address the systemic causes of
123. See Lam, supra note 7, at 623.
124. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219. (1994 & Supp. 11 1997).
125. See Garment Industry Sweatshops Persist, Government Finds, ST. Louis POST,
Oct. 19, 1997, at 3A.
126. See Hayashi, supra note 55, at 197.
127. See id.
128. Substantial budget cuts on both the federal and state level have significantly
reduced the number of labor inspectors. By 1996, only 10% of the 703 inspections
conducted by a joint task force of federal and state agents turned up cash paying
violations. See Lee, supra note 53, at D14.
129. See Rojas, supra note 81, at A6.
130. See Lam, supra note 7, at 644.
sweatshops nor do they prevent new shops from opening. The fines are
simply too insignificant and too sporadically enforced. Because of their
small size and the secretive nature of theii illegal alien workforce, it is
too easy for sweatshops to go unnoticed and, hence, not receive
citations. 3'
It is clear that the FLSA does not go far enough in stopping
sweatshops. Therefore, legal practitioners need to identify other
litigation strategies. The Thirteenth Amendment is a vastly under-
utilized legal tool. Under this amendment, a garment worker and her
advocate could seek restitution, for the harm that has been done to the
worker, from the sweatshop owner, from the manufacturer who
contracted with the sweatshop, and from the federal government for
failing to protect her. This litigation technique would have the effect of
hurting the defendant parties financially, which serves as a deterrent and
also provides relief for the plaintiff.
A. The Sweatshop Owners
1. A Private Right of Action Under the Thirteenth Amendment
The Thirteenth Amendment is self-executing. It needs no ancillary
legislation to give it effect.' Because it is an absolute prohibition on the
existence of slavery, private actors are liable for breaching the
Thirteenth Amendment. 33 Hence, an enslaved sweatshop worker can
bring suit against the sweatshop owners under the Thirteenth
Amendment. However, it is important for potential plaintiffs and legal
practitioners to recognize that the chances of collecting anything more
than nominal restitution from a sweatshop owner is unlikely. Certainly,
if a sweatshop owner has little capital and few assets, a legal victory
would be largely symbolic. Nevertheless, an enslaved worker should
bring suit against the sweatshop owner. A potential plaintiff can argue
that under the Thirteenth Amendment there is a private right of action to
directly sue the person imposing the conditions of involuntary servitude.
Similarly, this right can support a suit against clothing companies,
retailers, and the government.
As of yet, only two cases have discussed whether involuntary
131. Many shops that should be registered with the state are not. In New York City
alone, there are an estimated 2,000 unlicensed shops. They are often housed in lofts,
back rooms, and garages. See id. at 634.
132. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988) (citing The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)).
133. See Terry Properties, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1523, 1534 (11th Cir.
1986).
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servitude victims can sue their masters directly under the Thirteenth
Amendment. In Channer v. HallI 4 the Fifth Circuit allowed a victim of
involuntary servitude to sue his masters directly for damages under the
Thirteenth Amendment.' In contrast, in Turner v. Unification
Church,'36 a Rhode Island District Court held that the plaintiffs could not
sustain such an action.'" The court recognized that it had the power to
create a remedy for a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, but it
declined to do so."' Although the First Circuit affirmed the Rhode
Island court's decision, the 1978 district court decision is questionable
given the Fifth Circuit's 1997 ruling in Channer v. Hall. Moreover, a
great deal of the case law recognizing a private right of action occurred
after the Rhode Island District Court decision.
39
The argument for declaring that there is a private cause of action
under the Thirteenth Amendment' is based on the principles set forth in
the Supreme Court's decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.4 ' Bivens held that there is a private
right of action under the Fourth Amendment and that this right exists
because it gives effect to the amendment itself. 42  Where federally
protected rights are invaded, the court will adjust the remedies so as to
grant the necessary relief. 43 The Court cites Marbury v. Madison'4 for
134. 112 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 1997).
135. See id. at 219.
136. 473 F. Supp. 367 (D.R.I. 1978), affd, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979).
137. See 473 F. Supp. at 378.
138. See id.
139. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (holding that although the remedy was
not complete because it did not include attorney's fees or emotional damages, the court
will not second guess an elaborate remedial scheme set up by Congress); Carlson v.
Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (holding that withholding medical attention constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228
(1979) (inferring a private right of action directly under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment to provide relief to a congressional staffer who was fired because of
her gender).
140. Amar and Widawsky imply that a private right of action under the Thirteenth
Amendment is a constitutional "sure thing" under the logic of Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See Amar &
Widawsky, supra note 3, at 1380; see also Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir.
1978) (expanding Bivens actions to the Fifth Amendment); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d
167 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (expanding Bivens actions to the First Amendment).
141. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
142. See id. at 390-94.
143. See id. at 396 (inferring a private right of action against a federal agent who
violated the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights); see also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S.
228 (1979) (inferring a private right of action directly under the Due Process Clause of
the proposition that "[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists
in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever [one] receives an injury."'45
In Bivens, the Court recognized two situations where courts should
hesitate to infer private rights of action. First, they should resist when
there are "special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of
affirmative action by Congress."' There are no such special factors
here. Second, courts should be wary when Congress has articulated an
alternative mechanism for relief.'47 Congress has provided only criminal
prosecution for violations of the Thirteenth Amendment.
4 1
The courts have expanded Bivens beyond its original coverage of the
Fourth Amendment to include implied rights of action directly under the
First, 149 Fifth, 5 ' and Sixth Amendments.'5' The district court in Turner v.
Unification Church,'52 stated that "the right to be free from involuntary
servitude is clearly a federally protected interest."'53 Because freedom
from involuntary servitude is a federally protected interest, a federal
court following Bivens would have the "'power' to imply a cause of
action from the appropriate constitutional provision in order to redress
the violation.' ,514 After recognizing that they had the power to create
such a remedy, the court held that whether or not to do so was a
discretionary issue. The court next noted that the Thirteenth
Amendment in this specific case was not "necessary" or "appropriate" as
a basis for relief. 5 The court cited three grounds for denying a remedy:
first, there was no allegation of misconduct by a government agent;
second, the plaintiffs had an adequate remedy under state law; and third,
recognizing a cause of action would "constitutionalize" a large portion
the Fifth Amendment to provide relief to a congressional staffer who was fired because
of her gender). In Bivens, the court indicated that "where legal rights have been invaded,
and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts
may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done." Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396
(quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
144. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
145. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163).
146. Id. at 396.
147. See id. at 397.
148. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 1584 (1994 & Supp. 1111997).
149. See Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (expanding Bivens
actions to the First Amendment); Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862, 869-70 (3d Cir. 1975)
(expanding Bivens actions to the First Amendment).
150. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 234 (1979) (expanding Bivens actions to
the Fifth Amendment).
151. See Wounded Knee Legal Defense/Offense Comm. v. FBI, 507 F.2d 1281,
1284 (8th Cir. 1974) (expanding Bivens actions to the Sixth Amendment).
152. 473 F. Supp. 367 (1978).
153. Id. at 374.
154. Id. (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
155. Id.
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of state law."6
Despite the fact that this twenty-year-old decision is only one district
court's view, the court's conclusion that a Bivens remedy should only be
inferred when a government agent acts against a person's constitutional
interests is simply wrong. The Thirteenth Amendment is unique
because, unlike other amendments, it covers private conduct. To say
that government conduct is required to obtain a remedy under the
Thirteenth Amendment is to negate the entire purpose behind the
amendment. The court's second reason for denying a remedy is also
insufficient. The fact that individuals have an alternative state remedy
does not deprive them of their federal rights.' The third rationale is
also inadequate. The mere fact that state law remedies associated with
false imprisonment might become constitutional questions does not
render the federal remedy inappropriate.
The Constitution only refers to remedies in two instances: in habeas
corpus cases and in the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. This does not mean that all other constitutional violations
were intended to go without a remedy. Rather, it means that remedies
would be applied under common law. In Ward v. Board of County
Commissioners,'58 the Supreme Court held that there are implied
remedies for constitutional violations, even if they are not specified in
the text of the Constitution.'59 As Justice Brennan suggested in Davis v.
Passman,'6° it is important that constitutional rights not be meaningless,
hence those rights must be justiciable.6 ' Likewise in Carlson v.
Green,'62 the Court upheld the availability of a damages remedy in an
action which alleged that the failure of federal prison officials to provide
medical attention to plaintiff's now deceased son constituted cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
6 1
The cases in which the Supreme Court has resisted inferring private
rights of action under constitutional provisions have typically been cases
where the Court deemed the available remedy to be adequate.16 If there
156. See id.
157. See id. at 372-73.
158. 253 U.S. 17 (1920).
159. See id. at 21-24.
160. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
161. See id at 242.
162. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
163. See id. at 24.
164. See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 428-29 (1988) (holding that
congressionally provided remedies were adequate and stating that Congress is better
is no right of action directly under the Thirteenth Amendment, then a
person held in a condition of slavery by a private person has no right to
sue that person civilly. In order to effectuate the purpose of the
amendment, "the enslaved person must have legal redress against the
master."' 5
The value of the Turner case is limited in light of the Fifth Circuit's
recent conclusion in Channer v. Hall, that they would "assume,
arguendo, that the Thirteenth Amendment directly gives rise to a cause
of action for damages under the analysis articulated in [the Bivens case]
and its progeny."' Hence, without citing a case other than Bivens, the
Fifth Circuit simply assumed that there were no reasons under the logic
of Bivens that a private right of action should not be afforded under the
Thirteenth Amendment.
The defendants in Channer argued unsuccessfully that section 2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment, which grants "'Congress [the] power to pass all
laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of
slavery in the United States,"' meant that Congress prohibited a private
right of action directly under the Thirteenth Amendment. 67 Defendants
argued that Congress, by endowing itself with this power, had foreclosed
a private right of action directly under the amendment.6  The Court felt
that this reasoning was inapplicable to Channer's claim.'69
If the Supreme Court is willing to infer a private right of action
directly under constitutional amendments when there is no adequate
remedy under federal law, the garment workers should have little
difficulty suing their enslaving masters for civil damages under the
Thirteenth Amendment. However, unless there is a private right of
action under the Thirteenth Amendment, slaves cannot sue their masters
for damages under federal law.170 A court faced with a case such as the
El Monte case, where women were held as virtual prisoners for up to
seven years, would surely find a way to redress their harm. While
penalties under existing criminal laws can bring some measure of
compensation to the victims, at least emotionally, it is only through civil
situated to create the remedy than the courts); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 390 (1983)
(holding that although the remedy was not complete because it did not include attorney's
fees or emotional damages, the court will not second guess an elaborate remedial scheme
established by Congress).
165. Amar & Widawsky, supra note 3, at 1380.
166. Channer v. Hall, 112 F.3d 214,217 (5th Cir. 1997).
167. Id. at 217 n.5 (quoting Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968)
(quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883))).
168. See Channer, 112 F.3d at 217.
169. See id.
170. There are several different kinds of state torts under which they might seek
relief, such as wrongful imprisonment, kidnapping, assault and battery, etc.
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damages that such victims can exact their own measure of justice. In a
criminal case, the crime that the defendants are answering for is a crime
against the state. It is the state that prosecutes and the state that controls
the case. In a civil case, the victim has control and power. When they
win, they feel a sense of vindication, which is arguably not possible in
the criminal justice system.
The sweatshop operators have inflicted pain and suffering upon their
workers. They have held them against their will and forced them to toil
for little pay, in squalid conditions, without choice. As the Fifth Circuit
seems to note in its summary application of a private right of action to
the Thirteenth Amendment, this is clearly what the Thirteenth
Amendment was created to redress. Thus, it is extremely likely that a
court in a case such as El Monte would infer a private right of action.
2. Are Garment Workers Slaves?
Because it appears likely that a Thirteenth Amendment case against
the El Monte operators would be upheld in court, legal scholars and
practitioners next need to question whether a case against a more
garden-variety sweatshop owner would also succeed. As this Article has
already noted, few sweatshops have conditions as egregious as El
Monte. Working conditions in the garment industry rarely rise to the
level of horror experienced by the Thai garment workers. However,
sweatshops are often characterized by conditions and practices that
might rise to the level of an actionable claim under the Thirteenth
Amendment. The standard for bringing criminal charges under the
Thirteenth Amendment is that the individual is subjected to threats of or
actual physical or legal coercion to keep them in involuntary servitude.'
"[F]ree will and its negation have been the focus of the last half
century of criminal cases enforcing the Thirteenth Amendment."'' 2 The
dispute over the definition of involuntary servitude has centered on
whether or not an individual, who has neither been physically harmed,
threatened with harm, nor threatened with legal action, can ever be held
in involuntary servitude. The Ninth Circuit ruled that psychological
coercion alone could, under proper circumstances, result in an individual
being held in involuntary servitude.'
171. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931,952-53 (1988).
172. McConnell, supra note 3, at 221.
173. See United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Mussry 74 involved a
defendant who recruited non-English speaking Indonesians and paid
them more than they would make in Indonesia, but less than the U.S.
minimum wage. 5 To ensure that they worked fifteen hours a day for
seven days a week, the defendants held the workers' passports and return
plane ticketsY.6  The court found that "[a] holding in involuntary
servitude occurs when an individual coerces another into his service by
improper or wrongful conduct that is intended to cause, and does cause,
the other person to believe that he or she has no alternative but to
perform the labor."'" In reaching its decision, the court looked at the
individual harmed and formulated a subjective standard that asked
whether the experience would break their will.
78
In United States v. Shackney,'79 a case that predates Mussry by twenty
years, a Mexican man and his seven member family were recruited to
work on a farm. After making them sign a promissory note, the farmer
paid for their transport, housed them in a corrugated metal shed without
electricity or plumbing, gave them insufficient food, forced small
children to work, and confined the family to the farm. He kept them
captive by threatening them with deportation. The defendant refused to
allow the children to go to school or the man or his wife to go into
town.'8 ' Judge Friendly and the Second Circuit ruled that without
evidence of physical or legal coercion, a simple threat of deportation to
Mexico was not sufficient for a finding of criminal involuntary
servitude.'82 The threat of deportation was only sufficient, according to
Judge Friendly, if the "deportation [was] equivalent to imprisonment or
worse."
183
As noted previously, unlike most Thirteenth Amendment questions,
the Supreme Court has actually ruled on the definition of involuntary
servitude under the Thirteenth Amendment and the criminal prosecution
statutes.'9 In United States v. Kozminski, 5 the Supreme Court reviewed
a case where the defendants had held two mentally retarded men in hard
469 U.S. 855 (1984).
174. 726 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1984).
175. See id. at 1453.
176. See id.
177. Id.
178. See McConnell, supra note 3, at 223.
179. 333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964).
180. See id. at477.
181. See id. at 478.
182. See id. at 487.
183. Id. at 486.
184. The criminal prosecution statutes are codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 1584 (1994
& Supp. H 1997).
185. 487 U.S. 931 (1988).
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labor on their farm."6 The men had basically been found, one walking
along the road and the other in town, and brought to the farm.'" The
men worked seven days a week, often seventeen hours a day. While the
defendants initially paid the workers fifteen dollars a week, eventually
all compensation stopped. The defendants threatened the workers with
physical violence, threatened to put them in an institution, and subjected
them to various kinds of psychological coercion.' 88 In 1988, the
Supreme Court, ' in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, adopted a
requirement that in order for a court to find conditions of involuntary
servitude, the defendant must threaten or use physical or legal coercion
to intimidate the individual to remain in forced labor.' ° This case settled
a dispute between the above referenced circuits regarding whether
psychological coercion could be used to hold someone in involuntary
servitude.' 9'
At first glance, the standard set forth in Kozminski would appear to be
a tough hurdle for most victims of sweatshops to overcome. The El
Monte women were physically threatened and hence, under any
definition, a court would find them to be held in involuntary servitude.
But what of women who go home at the end of a fifteen-hour sweatshop
work day or who are paid substandard wages? What of women who
conceivably could quit? Would the courts consider these women to be
held in involuntary servitude? The majority in Kozminski left the door
open to possible use of threatened deportation to fit the definition of a
threat of legal action. '9 However, even without such a finding, the
women might be able to prevail under a civil application of the
Thirteenth Amendment.
It is a well-established principle under the rule of lenity that criminal
law applications are more narrowly defined than are civil applications.'93
186. See id. at 931.
187. See id. at 935.
188. See id.
189. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kozminski "to resolve [the] conflict
among the Courts of Appeals on the meaning of involuntary servitude for the purpose of
criminal prosecution under § 241 and § 1584." Id. at 939.
190. See id. at 952-53.
191. Compare United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984)
(holding that psychological coercion was sufficient), with'United States v. Shackney, 333
F.2d 475, 487 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding that psychological coercion was not sufficient).
192. See Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 948.
193. The rule of lenity provides that "where there is ambiguity in the language of a
statute concerning multiple punishment, ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity
in sentencing." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 902 (6th ed. 1990) (citing United States v.
423
This is because the ramifications of criminal law violations are far
greater than the ramifications of civil law violations. The Due Process
Clause requires that a potential defendant have clear notice of what
behavior will be subject to criminal penalties.'4 As the Kozminski Court
noted, the purpose of this standard is to "promote fair notice to those
subject to the criminal laws [and] to minimize the risk of selective or
arbitrary enforcement."" A case-by-case determination may not be
consistent with this goal in criminal law and hence notice is required.'
6
The Supreme Court noted that this rule of lenity commands that
"genuine ambiguities affecting a criminal statute's scope" should be
"resolved in the defendant's favor."'97 As the Court noted in Kozminski,
it was not making an assumption as to the reach of the Thirteenth
Amendment itself, but simply the criminal statutes passed under the
amendment's protection.
9 8
Unfortunately, despite the Supreme Court's limiting language, at least
two lower courts have applied the Kozminski standard to civil Thirteenth
Amendment cases.'" In the case of Channer v. Hall, the Fifth Circuit
extended the definition of involuntary servitude stated in Kozminski to a
civil suit brought by a prisoner forced to work in the Food Service
Office."' However, it is stated in a very brief decision in an extremely
summary fashion. Moreover, while the finding was based on an
exception to the Thirteenth Amendment, the court still held that the
defendant had been subjected to legal coercion.'O It is conceivable that
because the defendant fit within the scope of the involuntary servitude
definition as stated in Kozminski, it was easier for the court to adopt the
articulation of the definition in the civil context than to attempt in such a
perfunctory opinion to articulate a new standard.
Additionally, in the case of Buchanan v. City of Bolivar,= the Sixth
Circuit, clearly misreading the Kozminski decision, held that the
definition of involuntary servitude was the same under the criminal
Barrington, 662 F.2d 1046, 1054 (4th Cir. 1981)).
194. See Lauren Kares, The Unlucky Thirteenth: A Constitutional Amendment in
Search of a Doctrine, 80 CORNELLL. REV. 372, 388 (1994).
195. Kozininski, 487 U.S. at 952.
196. See id. at 951. The Court applied the "time-honored interpretive guideline that
uncertainty concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of
lenity." Id. at 952.
197. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259,266 (1997).
198. See Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 944 (stating that the Court "dr[e]w no
conclusions.., about the potential scope of the Thirteenth Amendment").
199. See Channer v. Hall, 112 F.3d 214, 217-18 (5th Cir. 1997); Buchanan v. City
of Bolivar, 99 F.3d 1352, 1357 (6th Cir. 1996).
200. See Channer, 112 f.3d at 218-19.
201. Seeid.at218.
202. 99 F.3d 1352 (6th Cir. 1996).
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enabling statutes of the Thirteenth Amendment as it was under the
Thirteenth Amendment itself. Under this misconception, the court
held that despite the fact that a child may have been psychologically
coerced into service against his will, he was not physically or legally
coerced and, therefore, did not have a civil claim under the Thirteenth
Amendment.0 4 Unlike the Fifth Circuit in Channer, the Sixth Circuit
clearly felt compelled to adopt the criminal definition of involuntary
servitude for use in civil cases. While its logic for incorporation, that it
was compelled by Kozminski, was wrong, its decision to use the same
standard is legally sound, although short-sighted. This is, however, the
opinion of only one circuit.
Therefore, it is still unclear which definition would apply in other
circuits to civil Thirteenth Amendment cases. The Supreme Court
specifically noted that it is easier to comprehend the "general spirit of
the phrase 'involuntary servitude"' than to define "the exact range of
conditions it prohibits."' 5
B. The Clothing Manufacturers and the Retailers
The second part of this three-part litigation strategy for achieving the
most advantageous outcome for all garment workers, and in particular
for the El Monte women, is to sue the clothing design and manufacturing
companies and retailers that contract with the sweatshops.2 Once the
plaintiffs have established that there is clearly a private right of action
under the Thirteenth Amendment, under which they can sue the
sweatshop owners, they can extrapolate that they can bring a suit under
the Thirteenth Amendment against the manufacturers as well.
Suits against the manufacturers have been tried under the FLSA.'
203. See id. at 1357.
204. See id. at 1358.
205. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 942.
206. This Article collectively refers to clothing companies that design and
manufacturer clothing, clothing companies that contract to have clothing manufactured
under their label, and retailers that contract to have their store-brand labels manufactured
as "manufacturers."
207. In a few instances, government agencies, typically the Department of Labor,
have gone after the manufacturers based on the "hot goods" provision in the FLSA. The
"hot goods" provision states that it is unlawful for anyone to transport any goods made in
violation of the FLSA. Typically, these sanctions are only pursued when repeated fines
against the shop itself have led the government to the same manufacturer over and over
again. See Lam, supra note 7, at 653. This provision only permits an injunction against
a non-employer, such as the manufacturer, with potential criminal penalties for non-
There has, however, never been successful litigation against clothing
manufacturers directly under the Thirteenth Amendment. Obviously,
there are several problems with litigation directed at the top of the
garment-making pyramid, but it is a strategy that potential plaintiffs
should try, albeit in conjunction with a suit against both the sweatshop
owners and the government.
There are two primary benefits to suing the contractor. First,
manufacturers have sufficient resources to pay damages, whereas
sweatshops are often judgment proof.2 Second, retailers provide the
impetus for the entire sweatshop system. It is quite possible that the
manufacturers recognize that the prices they pay to shop owners are far
too low to provide shop workers with minimum wage.'o Raising the
consciousness of the manufacturers would obliterate most sweatshops.
It is their claim of ignorance that allows the shops to flourish so
unabashedly. Clothing manufacturers are also in the best position to
comply with the FLSA. Unlike a shop owner, clothing manufacturers
are able to pass the increased cost of paying a living wage and overtime
on to the consumer.2" In the present situation, they unjustly reap a
benefit of low wage labor without having to bear any of the liability.
In the El Monte case, the plaintiffs alleged that the manufacturing
companies could be held liable for the sweatshop operator's actions
under three theories. First, they argued that, under the agency theory,
the companies were vicariously liable for the intentional torts of their
agents, the shop owners. Second, the plaintiffs contended that the
enforcement. The FLSA only provides a private right of action against employers. See
id.
Plaintiffs in the El Monte case asserted a negligence claim based on the "hot goods"
provision of the FLSA. See Bureerong v. Uvawas, 959 F. Supp. 1231, 1236 (C.D. Cal.
1997). The court dismissed the claim, holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim
for negligence. See id. The court did, however, allow the plaintiffs the opportunity to
plead their claim again, stating that it is possible to read into the FLSA a desire to protect
individual employees despite the fact that the act itself does not contain a private right of
action. See id. at 1237.
208. See Lam, supra note 7, at 644 (stating that penalties are inconsequential when
compared to a sweatshop's total profits).
209. Charles Wang, the Executive Director of the Greater Blouse, Skirt and
Undergarment Association, claims that manufacturers often pay a piece rate that
translates to paying people three to four dollars an hour. See Steven Greenhouse,
Gannent Shops Found to Break Wage Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1997, at B1.
210. Despite the fact that a manufacturer is best able to bear the costs of complying
with regulations aimed at breaking up the sweatshops, the laws are typically targeted at
the shop owner rather than the manufacturer. State regulations (i.e., registration and
licensing requirements for apparel shops with more than a certain number of employees,
sanctions against homework systems, sign posting requirements to assist officials in
locating shops, and record keeping requirements) are all directed at the shop owners. See
Lam, supra note 7, at 643.
211. See Bureerong, 959 F. Supp. at 1235.
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companies were jointly liable for aiding and abetting the intentional torts
of the shop owners. Finally, under a joint employer theory, the workers
argued that the contracting clothing companies were jointly liable with
the shop owners for any intentional torts committed under the FLSA.1 2
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the district court found that
there was sufficient evidence against the defendants as agents under a
vicarious liability theory for the claim to go forward. The court held that
under the doctrine of respondeat superior, employers were responsible
for the "malicious acts and other intentional torts" of their employees if
committed within the scope of their employment.213 Potentially, this
would cover even non-sanctioned criminal acts committed by the
employee.214 The court based this conclusion on both California law and
the Restatement (Second) of Agency.1 5 The decision never reached any
question that involved federal law, holding that because there was merit
to the agency claim, the case should not be dismissed.2 6
In addition to the above claims, the plaintiffs in the El Monte case
should also have brought an action against the clothing companies under
the Thirteenth Amendment. In the following sections, this Article shows
that potential plaintiffs can bring suits both directly under the Thirteenth
Amendment and through 42 U.S.C. § 1986, an enabling statute passed
under the Thirteenth Amendment. A direct suit against the contracting
clothing company, under the Thirteenth Amendment, can prevail by
either showing that the garment workers were in fact employees of the
manufacturers or by showing that the contracting clothing company was
a joint employer. Under § 1986, plaintiffs must show that the defendant
clothing design or distribution company had knowledge of the
conspiracy that existed at the sweatshop that deprived the workers of
their civil rights, and that the company was in a position to aid the
workers but failed to do so.




216. See id. at 1236.
1. Is the Sweatshop a De-Facto Employee of the Garment
Manufacturer?
a. Employee or Independent Contractor?
The garment manufacturer is the entity that controls the sweatshop
system. There are less than 1,000 manufacturers that parcel out
contracts to approximately 20,000 sweatshops, which enter and exit the
industry constantly.17  Without the manufacturers placing orders with
the sweatshops, there would simply be no sweatshops." 8 However, the
attenuated relationship between the garment worker and the
manufacturer exists for a reason."9 Commentators believe that the
relationship exists to insulate the manufacturer from liability to the
garment worker. It is far cheaper for the apparel manufacturers to
contract the work out to sweatshops, which cut comers on wage laws,
health benefits, and sanitary working conditions, than it is for the
manufacturers to hire their own workers and assume the liability for
treating them improperly 20 Therefore, not only do manufacturers
receive the benefits of com2petition between the sweatshop contractors to
win and keep contracts, but they also receive moral and legal
insulation from violations of labor laws.m The garment worker is
technically an employee of the sweatshop, which is an independent
contractor of the manufacturer. Hence, no employer-employee
relationship exists between the garment worker and the manufacturer.'m
Herein lies the heart of the problem facing any suit against the
217. See GAO REPORT, supra note 5.
218. Susan Cowell, Vice-President of the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and
Textile Employees (UNITE), claims that conditions in sweatshops will not improve until
the largest retailers are targeted. See Haq, supra note 58, at 6-7.
219. The relationship may be even more attenuated than assumed by this Article.
There is evidence that shops often subcontract their orders out to other shops without the
knowledge of the manufacturer, making the manufacturer's ability to monitor even
harder. See White & McDonnell, supra note 43, at Dll.
220. See Lam, supra note 7, at 629-30.
221. There are so many shops bidding for the manufacturers' business that the
profits the contractors make are as minimal as the wages they pay. See id. at 630.
222. It is cheaper for the manufacturers to contract work out to a sweatshop than to
hire their own garment workers. See id.
223. The retailer, who is supplied by the manufacturer, who is supplied by the
contractor, who pays the garment worker, heads the garment industry business structure.
The manufacturer designs the clothes and often provides the fabrics. The contractors
employ cutters, seamstresses, trimmers, and pressers. See id. at 629. The retailer usually
receives more than a 100% mark-up and the manufacturer gets twice the price the
contractor gets. See id. For example, workers who sewed dresses for Jessica
McClintock, which retailed for $175.00 each, were paid only $5.00 per dress. See Sarah
Henry, Can an Upstart Women's Group Press a New Wrinkle into the Rag Trade Wars?,
L.A. TaMEs MAO., Aug. 1, 1993, at 20, 22.
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manufacturer-the entire system has been established to shield the
manufacturer from liability. Yet, despite the valiant efforts of the
manufacturers' attorneys, it may be possible to prove, that the garment
worker is a de facto employee of the manufacturer.' M Most courts
employ the "economic reality" testp to determine whether a worker is
an employee or an independent contractor under the FLSA.2 6  The
Seventh Circuit utilized this test in Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen,2 to
determine that migrant farm workers were employees under the FLSA.m
The court focused on the economic reality of the migrant farm workers'
situation. The court examined how dependent the migrant workers were
upon the business for which they labored.
Under the economic realities test, the courts examine the facts of the case in
light of the following criteria: (1) the extent to which the services in question
are an integral part of the "employer's" business; (2) the amount of the
"employee's" investment in facilities and equipment; (3) the nature and degree
of control retained or exercised by the "employer"; (4) the "employee's"
opportunities for profit or loss... ; (5) the amount of initiative, skill, judgment,
or foresight required for the success of the claimed2Wdependent enterprise; and
(6) the permanency and duration of the relationship.
In applying the above six criteria to a case in which sweatshops
contracted with manufacturers, a reviewing court would have a great
deal of discretion. The test, when applied to such a case, is far from
conclusive. As to the first element, the extent to which the questioned
services are central to the business, the shop is an integral part of the
manufacturer's everyday business. The manufacturer could not function
without the shop assembling its garments. This element of the test
favors a finding that the sweatshop is not simply an independent
employer, but rather, represents an employee of the manufacturer.
224. One article has suggested that the only way to accomplish this is if Congress
amends the FLSA to create a cause of action specifically against the manufacturer. See
Hayashi, supra note 55, at 196.
225. See Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Determination of "Independent Contractor"
and "Employee" Status for Purposes of § 3(e)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (29
USCS § 203(e)(1)), 51 A.L.R. FED. 702,706 (1997).
226. This Article uses the FLSA as a starting point because the nature of the claim,
that the victims are being held in involuntary servitude, is more akin to a wage and hour
violation under the FLSA than a workers compensation or unemployment claim.
227. 835 F.2d 1529 (7th Cir. 1987).
228. See id. at 1534.
229. Landis, supra note 225, at 706. See Henderson v. Inter-Chem Coal Co., 41
F.3d 567, 570 (10th Cir. 1994); Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assoc., 603 F.2d 748, 754
(9th Cir. 1979); Usery v. Pilgrim Equip. Co., 527 F.2d 1308, 1311 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 826 (1976); Brennan v. Partida, 492 F.2d 707, 709 (5th Cir. 1974).
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Element number two, the amount of the employee's investment in
facilities and equipment, most likely favors the manufacturer. The
sweatshop buys its own equipment and hires its own workers. The
owner invests in rent and decides where to locate the business. One
court, however, approached this element by weighing the relative
investment of the "employee" versus the investment of the
"employer."'  In that case, which involved farm workers, the court
found that the purchase of shovels, hoses, and picking carts was minimal
in comparison with the grower's purchase of land, heavy machinery, and
other supplies necessary for cultivating the strawberries.23' While in the
case of garment workers the facts may not be nearly as strong, plaintiffs'
counsel could allege that the sweatshop owners' investment is also
minimal. Simply purchasing sewing machines and renting space is an
insignificant investment when compared to the entire set-up of the
manufacturer, which includes designing the clothes and patterns,
marketing the clothes, and providing the fabric, zippers, buttons, and
other supplies needed to assemble the clothes.
The third element, the degree of control the employer exercises or
retains over the employees' work, as with the first criterion, appears to
favor the finding of an employer/employee relationship. The
manufacturer clearly controls the work of the sweatshop. While the
sweatshop owners control whom they hire or fire and the places of
production, there is little else under their control. The manufacturer
determines when the pieces will be completed, how they will be
completed, the pattern in which the pieces will be cut, the price for
which the pieces will sell, and often supplies the fabric out of which the
clothing will be made.232 A factor that may be relevant to this analysis is
that the sweatshop owners have an extremely low level of bargaining
power in their negotiations with the manufacturer23' This suggests that
the sweatshop owners are merely the manufacturers' agents.21
The fourth element examines the sweatshop's ability to control its
own opportunity for profit and loss. The courts wield great discretion in
determining whether this element has been satisfied. A court could
conclude that the sweatshop bargained with the manufacturer for a price
and that they controlled their own profit and loss. Alternatively, a court
could conclude that the sweatshop has an unfair disadvantage in the
230. See Driscoll Strawberry Assoc., 603 F.2d at 755.
231. See id.
232. See Lam, supra note 7, at 658-59.
233. Often, another recent immigrant, potentially a former garment worker who
saved enough money to buy a few sewing machines and rent space, owns the contracting
shop. In general, sweatshop owners are very inexperienced. See id. at 630.
234. See id. at 661.
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bargaining process-that they are at the mercy of the manufacturer and,
therefore, have little control over the outcome.
The fifth element asks the court to examine the amount of initiative,
skill, judgment, and foresight required for the success of the claimed
independent enterprise. While there is little special skill that the
sweatshop operator provides the manufacturer (i.e., the manufacturer is
capable of hiring its own crew of garment workers), the sweatshop
operator does establish his own shop, on his own initiative. The
questions of judgment and foresight are extremely subjective and,
therefore, are probably dependent on the individual facts of the case.
The sixth element, the duration of the relationship, is also largely
dependent upon the individual working relationship in the specific case
before the court. While some sweatshops are fly-by-night operations,
most sweatshops have long-standing relationships with manufacturers. 5
What is clear is that manufacturers are permanently in need of a shop to
assemble their goods. In this sense, the relationship is intended to be a
permanent one. Courts have found that contracts for as little as a year
that are routinely renewed may qualify as a permanent relationship. 6
The courts do not consider any one of the six elements controlling.
All courts applying the test have agreed that the elements are merely
tools by which to gauge the degree of the worker's dependence.2 7 While
it is unclear whether a court would find that a sweatshop was in an
employer/employee relationship with the manufacturer, it is clear that
the agreements between the parties as to employment status do not
control. In Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb,238 the Supreme Court
argued that what mattered most in determining independent contractor
status was not the particular formalities constructed by the employer.
For example, the mere fact that the farm owner in Lauritzen wrote
contracts declaring the migrant workers to be independent contractors
was held not to be determinative. 39  Rather, the circumstances
surrounding the entire activity should be considered.40
In addition to holding that the contracts themselves are not controlling,
courts have concluded that the subjective intent of the parties is not
235. See Chaiyarachta, supra note 15, at 194.
236. See Usery v. Pilgrim Equip. Co., 527 F.2d 1308, 1312 (5th Cir. 1976).
237. See id. at 1311.
238. 331 U.S. 722 (1947).
239. See Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1534 (7th Cir. 1987).
240. See Lam, supra note 7, at 651.
controlling2I Therefore, courts have found an employer/employee
relationship to exist even where both parties intended to and agreed to
form an independent contractor relationship. 2
The manufacturers sued in the El Monte case filed a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion declaring that, under the FLSA, the garment workers could not
be considered their employees. After performing an analysis very
similar to the one discussed above, the district court held that the
definition of "employee" under the FLSA was unclear but that, for
purposes of the case, it would hold that an employer/employee
relationship did exist.243 The statute itself defines "employee" in a
circular manner as "any individual employed by an employer."2 The
verb "employ" is defined as to "suffer or permit to work."2' The court
in the El Monte case followed the Ninth Circuit ruling that courts "must
be mindful of the directive that [the FLSA] is to be liberally
construed."2' The court reasoned that it was to rule in accordance with
Congress' goals in passing the FLSA.247 The court indicated that,
according to the Supreme Court, the FLSA's definition of an employee,
as any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer,
was to be construed "expansively. ''US Thus, the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the definition instructed lower courts to "stretch[] the
meaning of 'employee' to cover some parties who might not qualify as
such under a strict application of traditional agency law principles."24
In finding that the courts have broad discretion to define the term
"employer," the court noted that the Supreme Court had instructed lower
courts to inquire "whether there is an employment relationship under the
FLSA [by examining the] 'economic reality' rather than 'technical
concepts."'2' 0  Specifically, the reviewing court is to examine the
"totality of the circumstances,"' rather than the contractual labels in
241. See, e.g., Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assoc., 603 F.2d 748, 755 (9th Cir.
1979); Pilgrim Equip. Co., 527 F.2d at 1315; Brennan v. Partida, 492 F.2d 707, 709 (5th
Cir. 1974).
242. See id.
243. See Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1467 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
244. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (1988).
245. Id. § 203(g).
246. Bureerong, 922 F. Supp. at 1466 (quoting Biggs v. Wilson, 1 F.3d 1537, 1539
(9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1081 (1994)).
247. See Bureerong, 922 F. Supp. at 1466.
248. See id. at 1467 (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326-
27 (1992)); see also Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728 (1947)
(holding that the definition of "employ" is broad).
249. Id. at 1467 (quoting Darden, 503 U.S. at 326).
250. Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1393 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Goldberg v.
Whitaker House Coop., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961)). See Bureerong, 922 F. Supp. at 1467.
251. Hale, 993 F.2d at 1394.
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order to determine employee status under the FLSA.n2
The Ninth Circuit has elaborated on the language of the Supreme
Court and has provided lower courts with indicators of whether there is
an employer/employee relationship. The five-part analysis, which is
similar to the six criteria that are commonly used in the economic reality
test, assesses: (1) whether the employer has the power to hire or fire
employees; (2) whether the employer supervises or controls the work
schedules and conditions of employment; (3) whether the employer
determines the rate of payment; (4) whether the employer maintains
employee records;23 and (5) whether the employee's services are an
integral part of the employer's business' The district court cautioned
that these criteria are not "etched in stone and will not be blindly
applied."' 5
The crux of the analysis under the economic reality test, according to
the district court in the El Monte case, is how dependent the employee is
upon the employer2 6  As the Supreme Court noted in Bartels v.
Birmingham, the issue is whether the individuals as a "matter of
economic reality are dependent upon the business to which they render
service." s8 In the El Monte case, the district court found that the
garment workers and the manufacturers were clearly not in a typical
employer-employee relationship.2s The manufacturer had no power to
hire or fire and did not exercise direct supervision over the workers.
2
11
The claim does, however, argue that the plaintiffs were an integral part
of the manufacturers work,26' and that the manufacturers' practice of
contracting at absurdly low prices for garments prohibited the payment
of minimum wage and overtime, making it impossible for the contractor
to comply with the FLSA.2 2 Further, the court recognized that the
defendants might have engaged in such practices specifically to avoid
252. See Bureerong, 922 F. Supp. at 1467.
253. See Bonnette v. California Health and Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470
(9th Cir. 1983).
254. See Donovan v. Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1981).
255. Bureerong, 922 F. Supp. at 1468 (quoting Donovan, 656 F.2d at 1370).
256. See id.
257. 332 U.S. 126 (1947).
258. Id. at 130.




liability under wage and hour laws.263 Finally, the court found that,
under the liberal rules of pleading, the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged
that there was an employer-employee relationship.
26
While the district court in the El Monte case was willing to construe
the FLSA statute quite liberally to find that the manufacturers were the
employers of the sweatshop, it is clear that another court could decide
differently, even under the same analysis. The test is extremely
malleable.
b. The Joint Employer Relationship
Yet another alternative is to show that there is a joint employer
relationship. The joint employer relationship exists:
where one employer is acting directly or indirectly in [another employer's]
interest in relation to the employee and... where the employers are not
completely disassociated with respect to the employment of a particular
employee and may be deemed to share control of the employee, directly or
indirectly, by reason of the fact that one employe 6gontrols, is controlled by, or
is under common control with the other employer.
The issue is whether a group of employees clearly employed by one
employer, here-the sweatshop, can be deemed to be employees of
another separate employer, here-the manufacturer. Once courts have
found that the two entities were actually joint employers, they have held
both employers liable for FLSA violations.26 Hence, in a potential
garment worker case, the court could hold the manufacturer liable for
holding the garment workers in involuntary servitude.
The Supreme Court has noted that the primary element in determining
whether a joint employer relationship exists is the "indicia of control"
exercised by an employer over the work of the others' employees.267
Like the independent contractor test, the joint employer test accords little
weight to the contractual agreement between the parties.26
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has found that a garment
manufacturer and a contractor, who sewed and pressed the garments
produced for the manufacturer, were joint employers. The NLRB
viewed the fact that the contractor was dependent on the manufacturer in
263. See id.
264. See id. at 1469.
265. Maldonado v. Lucca, 629 F. Supp. 483,487 (D.N.J. 1986).
266. See Annotation, When Are Separate Business Entities "Joint Employers" of
Same Employees for Purposes of Application of Federal Labor Laws, 73 A.L.R. FED.
609 (1985) [hereinafter Joint Employers].
267. See Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964).
268. See Joint Employers, supra note 266, at § 2[a].
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order to meet its payroll as decisive.29 The specific case involved a
contractor, who rented space from the manufacturer, but maintained
separate bookkeeping and payroll systems." While the sweatshops
discussed in this Article are not on the manufacturer's premises, they too
are dependent on the manufacturer for financial survival.
The plaintiffs in the El Monte case alleged a joint employer claim as
well. The District Court, in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, found that
this was a possible claim against the manufacturers.2 Without ruling on
the specifics of the claim, the court refused to foreclose the possibility
that the manufacturers were indeed joint employers.
c. Conclusion
As the above discussion suggests, the manufacturer can be found
directly liable for the actions of the sweatshop owner as the garment
workers' de facto employer. A claim is highly possible and is clearly
worth bringing. As is clear from the El Monte case, under egregious
circumstances, like those surrounding sweatshop exploitation and
involuntary servitude, courts are willing to stretch the definition of
employer beyond its traditional boundaries.
2. Under the Civil Rights Statutes
While it may be possible to sue manufacturers directly under the
Thirteenth Amendment,272 legal practitioners often find it more practical
to sue under an enabling statute.273 Although attorneys commonly rely
on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this statute requires state action before redress can
be obtained. Therefore, in order to obtain redress, plaintiff garment
workers need a statute that condemns private as well as public action. In
contrast to § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), also known as the Ku Klux
269. See Freda Redmond and Sir James, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 1025 (1964).
270. See id.
271. See Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1468 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
272. See supra Part IV.A.1.
273. For example, in Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367 (D.R.I. 1978),
the plaintiff failed to persuade the court to infer a right of action under the Thirteenth
Amendment. See id. at 374. But see Baker v. McDonald's Corp., 686 F. Supp. 1474,
1480 (S.D. Fla. 1987), aff'd, 865 F.2d 1272 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 812
(1989) (permitting a suit to proceed under the Thirteenth Amendment pursuant to §
1985(3)).
435
Klan Act, does not require state action.274 Conspiracy to violate the
Thirteenth Amendment has formed the basis of a suit brought pursuant
to § 1985(3).2"
Section 1985(3) provides that "[i]f two or more persons...
conspire... for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly,
any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws... the
party so injured or deprived may have an action." '276 The statute requires
not that there be racial animus, but that the discriminatory animus
behind the conspirators' action is at least class-based.2' This class-based
requirement has been met in cases where immigrants are the class being
discriminated against.7"
In order to establish a § 1985(3) claim, the plaintiff must prove four
elements: (1) a conspiracy;279 (2) for the purpose of depriving, either
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of equal protection
of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the laws; (3) an
act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) actual injury to a person or
his property or deprivation of any right granted to a citizen of the United
States.2 80
Section 1985(3) itself creates no rights; it is simply a vehicle to secure
damages for deprivation of federally protected rights derived from other
sources, such as the Thirteenth Amendment. To bring a suit under §
1985(3) against the manufacturers directly would be almost impossible.
It would be extremely difficult to prove that the manufacturer had
actually conspired with the sweatshop owner. In Byrd v. Local Union
No. 24, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,"' the
Maryland District Court held that a general contractor's mere knowledge
of a subcontractor's discriminatory acts toward the plaintiff did not make
the general contractor a party to a conspiracy by continuing to employ
the subcontractor. z2  In Byrd, the plaintiff alleged that the general
contractor's knowledge of the subcontractor's practice of racial
discrimination was sufficient to bring a claim under § 1985(3). There
was no evidence that the general contractor was in any way involved in
274. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,409 (1968).
275. See Baker, 686 F. Supp. at 1480.
276. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988).
277. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
278. See Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 518 F.
Supp. 993, 1006 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
279. The conspiracy need not be an explicit agreement; it may be implied from the
circumstances. See Hunt v. Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. 1097, 1107 (D. Mass. 1986).
280. See Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 7 F.3d 1085, 1087 (2d
Cir. 1993).
281. 375 F. Supp. 545 (D. Md. 1974).
282. See id. at 558.
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the discrimination. 3
Because a § 1985(3) action seems improbable, the plaintiffs should
consider mounting a § 1986 claim. Section 1986 is an action for
negligence based on a failure to prevent a § 1985(3) violation.m
Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be
done, and mentioned in section 1985 of this tifle, are about to be committed, and
having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same,
neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful act be committed .... which such
person by reasonable diligence cotj have prevented; and such damages may be
recovered in an action on the case.
In order for a plaintiff to state a § 1986 claim, she must claim that she
can state a claim under § 1985(3) against another party. 6 The plaintiff
must also show that "the defendant had actual knowledge of a [§] 1985
conspiracy [and] had the power to prevent or aid in preventing [a
conspiracy, but]... neglected or refused to prevent [the wrongful act
committed], and.., a wrongful act was committed."2 7 In the case of the
garment workers, plaintiffs could allege that the conspiracy existed
amongst the owners and operators of the sweatshop. In the El Monte
case, there were eight defendants arrested for participating in the holding
of the women. Clearly, they had engaged in a conspiracy to deprive the
Thai women of their civil rights. The conspiracy requirement itself
would be satisfied as long as the sweatshop had more than one manager
or supervisor.2" The only real difficulty in bringing a § 1986 claim
against a manufacturer would be proving that they had actual knowledge
of the conspiracy.
However, there is evidence that the manufacturer is fully aware of the
low wages paid to the garment workers, because manufacturers typically
factor these wages into their calculation of how much to charge for the
retail product. One author notes that a typical skirt, which retails for
$120.00, provides the manufacturer with a twenty-five dollar profit and
the contractor with a ten dollar profit, of which the garment worker
typically receives two dollars and forty cents.2 9 The fact that the
283. See id. at 558-59.
284. See 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1988).
285. Id.
286. See McCalden v. California Library Ass'n, 955 F.2d 1214, 1223 (9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 957 (1992).
287. Clark v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290, 1295 (3d Cir. 1994).
288. The statute requires that two or more persons act in concert. See 42 U.S.C §
1985(3) (1988).
289. See Chaiyarachta, supra note 15, at 190 (claiming that the labor costs, material
manufacturer knows the costs involved suggests that they are probably
aware of and control the entire production process.2 ° Indeed, plaintiffs
in the El Monte case alleged that "the 'manufacturers' contracted with
the [sweatshop owners] to produce garments at prices too low to permit
payment of employees' minimum wages and overtime."291
While the manufacturers are aware that they are paying sub-standard
prices and that the shop owners cannot possibly afford to pay minimum
wages, the knowledge that they are facilitating violations of the FLSA is
not sufficient to make a claim under § 1986. The manufacturers must
have concrete knowledge of the conspiracy. Nevertheless,
manufacturers also have a basic understanding of how their industry
works. They know that garments are often manufactured in sweatshop
conditions and yet they never investigate the shops with which they
contract. It seems plausible to conclude that manufacturers prefer
ignorance; for them, the danger lies in really knowing that their garments
are not made in compliance with federal laws.
Hopefully, these arguments would be sufficient to carry a potential
case beyond the pleading stage and into discovery. Once in the
discovery phase, the plaintiffs can locate more concrete evidence that the
manufacturers knew that they contracted to have workers produce their
garments under sweatshop-like conditions. It is important to remember
that the manufacturers created this system in order to remove themselves
from liability for the manufacturing process. By contracting out labor,
they attempt to distance themselves from the more unseemly side of the
garment business. The manufacturers created this method in order to
insure ignorance; such self-imposed ignorance should not insulate them
from liability. Their actions are simply too deliberate. Justice cannot
allow the manufacturers to avoid liability simply by putting on blinders
and pretending not to see the havoc they create. But this is exactly what
the manufacturers would have the courts allow them to do. Based on
these intuitive arguments, the courts can deduce that manufacturers had
knowledge of the conspiracy and that they were in a position to stop the
deprivation of rights, or at least to aid in the workers' salvation. Once
they learn that the garments are being produced using illegal methods,
the manufacturers could cancel their contracts, refuse to work with
sweatshops, or raise the price they pay per garment, thereby allowing the
sweatshops to pay the workers more.
costs, and expected profit margins are taken into account by manufacturers in calculating
the retail price).
290. See id.
291. Bureerong v. Urawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1460 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
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3. Summary
If the courts hold the manufacturers liable for their actions, contractors
would lose their freedom to run their shops as sweatshops. It would
eliminate much of the under bidding that drives down the wages of
garment workers. It would also encourage contractors to establish more
stable and efficient operations.2 2 This stability could endow them with
greater bargaining power, allowing them to demand higher prices, and
hence, pay the workers more.2'
The manufacturer is the most powerful player in this triangle
composed of sweatshop owners, the manufacturers, and the federal
government. The sweatshop owner is the most dire villain and the
government is supposed to be the outside legal force, but it is the
manufacturers who have the greatest ability to effect change. If the
manufacturers were able to self-regulate, to reach a consensus that they
did not want to be involved in the marketing of human bondage, then
actions against the sweatshop owners and the government would not be
necessary. The sweatshop owners would not exist and the government
would not need to take such an active regulatory role.
Unfortunately, it is extremely unlikely that the manufacturers will
suddenly decide to band together and eliminate slavery and sweatshops
from their industry.294 Therefore, legal practitioners need to encourage
morality through litigation. A litigation strategy focused on the
manufacturers does not promise certain victory. It is for this reason that
practitioners and scholars must explore focusing litigation on another
power, one capable of forcing sweatshop owners and manufacturers to
comply with the law, the federal government.
C. The Federal Government
A suit against the manufacturers is, as noted above, a definite
possibility. But it would be breaking new legal ground. No court has
ever held a relationship as attenuated as the relationship between the
manufacturers and the contractors, with as little direct control over the
292. Today, sweatshops last an average of 13 months. See id. at 1471.
293. See Chaiyarachta, supra note 15, at 194.
294. Randall Harris, Executive Director of the San Francisco Fashion Industries
trade group, claims that the manufacturers are not responsible for the contractors'
employees, because they are employees of a separate business. See Catherine Yang &
Christina Del Valle, In a Sweat Over Sweatshops, Bus. WK., Apr. 4, 1994, at 40.
particular workers, to constitute an employer-employee relationship.
While the plaintiffs in Bureerong v. Uvawas did direct their litigation
against the manufacturers, due to the fact that the operators themselves
were judgment proof, the district court was unable to render a decision
on that case's merits.295 The court did issue a 12(b)(6) ruling which took
a strong stance in favor of the plaintiffs; however, the case settled before
the court ruled on the merits of the arguments.296 Hence, while any case
seeking damages on behalf of garment workers should offer a claim
against the manufacturers, it is imperative that potential plaintiffs file
another claim based more firmly in precedent, albeit precedent that has
long been forgotten. It is in this spirit that this Article proposes a suit
against government officials for failure to protect individuals, who are
subjected to slavery or involuntary servitude, under the Thirteenth
Amendment.297
The Thirteenth Amendment is the only amendment that confers an
affirmative right to government aid.2 The language of the amendment,
that slavery shall not exist, goes beyond the mere outlawing of slavery.
It does more than simply prohibit states from passing laws sanctioning
slavery. It imposes an affirmative duty upon the state and the federal
government "to provide an adequate apparatus to enforce the
emancipation of all persons within its jurisdiction. '29 It goes beyond
simply not requiring state action to state a claim. It goes further than
simply covering private and public enslavement. "[P]recisely because
the Amendment imposes a legal duty on private masters, it
simultaneously requires the state to enforce that legal duty.' 31
The courts have failed to recognize that the Thirteenth Amendment is
a potentially powerful tool by which courts can free people that the law
may deem not held captive. However, a few scholars have suggested
possible unique uses for the amendment. They have suggested using the
amendment to support a woman's right to an abortion,301 to sue
perpetrators of forced prostitution,302 to prosecute husbands who batter
295. See Kang, supra note 51, at Al.
296. See id.
297. Some commentators have suggested that it is not fair to turn manufacturers
into INS agents or labor inspectors. While heavy fines against manufacturers will
certainly decrease the instances of sweatshops, the government should not be allowed to
"pass the buck" completely. See Rojas, supra note 81, at Al.
298. See Amar & idawsky, supra note 3, at 1380-81.
299. Id. at 1380.
300. Id. at 1381.
301. See Koppelman, supra note 3, at 484 (claiming that forcing a woman to carry a
baby to term is akin to modem day slavery).
302. See Katyal, supra note 3, at 792 (suggesting that government officials who fail
to enforce laws against pimps are acting unconstitutionally under the Thirteenth
Amendment).
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their wives,3"3 and to rectify the legal quandary that immigrant women
married to citizen husbands who batter them face during their
conditional residency period* 4
But it is Professor Akil Reed Amar and Daniel Widawsky who first
asserted the theory that is an essential ingredient to this Article's
litigation strategy. Amar and Widawsky note that the Thirteenth
Amendment is unique in that it places an affirmative duty upon the
government to prevent involuntary servitude.0 5 Amar and Widawsky
point out that their proposition, that a constitutional provision requires
affirmative action on the part of the government, is neither new nor out
of the ordinary.3°  They look to the requirements of Article I, Section 2,
a decennial census and a biennial congressional election, as illustrative
of this point."' Additionally, Article I, Section 8 requires Congress to
raise and support armies and to establish post offices and roads."'
Amar and Widawsky's article is framed as presenting a counter
litigation strategy to the one adopted by the plaintiffs attorney in
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services.0 9 In
DeShaney, the court permitted little Joshua DeShaney to remain in his
father's custody31 despite evidence of repeated abuse, including several
episodes of hospitalization." ' The county social services office was
aware of the abuse and had sufficient evidence to remove Joshua from
his father's home. Yet, the county allowed him to remain in his father's
custody, until the boy was beaten so severely that he became
303. See McConnell, supra note 3, at 210 (stating that battered women are held in
involuntary servitude and that civil and criminal constitutional claims should be brought
against the batterer under the Thirteenth Amendment).
304. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 1430 (stating that immigrant women who are
dependent on their abusive spouses for their legal status are being held in involuntary
servitude).
305. See Amar & Widawsky, supra note 3, at 1381-82.
306. See id. at 1381.
307. See id.
308. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
309. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
310. After Joshua DeShaney's parents divorced, the court awarded his father,
Randy DeShaney, custody. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 191.
311. There was evidence that Joshua was repeatedly beaten beginning at age two or
three. See id. at 191-92. In January of 1982, Joshua's stepmother first reported the
abuse. See id. at 192. The Winnebago County Department of Social Services
interviewed Randy regarding the reported abuse, but did not take any further action. See
id. In January of 1983, Joshua was hospitalized for suspected abuse and the Department
of Social Services briefly placed him in the hospital's custody. See id. He was later
hospitalized again and social services did nothing. See id.
permanently disabled 12 Even Justice Rehnquist found the facts of the
DeShaney case "undeniably tragic." '313 The plaintiffs in DeShaney
argued that the Fourteenth Amendment imposed a duty on the state to
protect Joshua. But, the Court held that the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was not to require that the state protect people from each
other, but rather to protect people against state action.3 4
According to Amar and Widawsky, this is the beauty of the Thirteenth
Amendment. It places an affirmative burden upon the state. Under the
Thirteenth Amendment, the state has a duty to protect people from being
held in a condition of involuntary servitude, even if ordinary citizens
subject them to that condition.35 Because the Thirteenth Amendment
applies to private, as well as state, action and imposes an affirmative
duty upon the state to act in the face of evidence of involuntary
servitude,316 Amar and Widawsky concluded that Joshua DeShaney
would have a cause of action under the Thirteenth Amendment against
the county for failing to come to his aid.317
The Thirteenth Amendment is written in broad sweeping terms:
"slavery... shall [not] exist."3 ' It is this mandatory language that
"commands the state to affirmatively protect" the individual held in
involuntary servitude.3 9 Once the state has been made aware of private
violations of the amendment it has a duty to intervene.32°
Amar and Widawsky note that the DeShaney Court was hesitant to
make such a sweeping statement with respect to the state's duty under
the Fourteenth Amendment. 2' They note that the "Rehnquist Court
Justices have perfectly sensible and principled reasons to be skeptical of
claims wrapped in the language of substantive due process. 322 If the
courts required the states to right private wrongs, "an unending parade of
312. In March of 1984, Randy beat Joshua so severely that Joshua fell into a life-
threatening coma. Emergency brain surgery revealed a series of hemorrhages caused by
numerous blows to the head inflicted over a long period of time. Joshua lived, but he
suffered brain damage so severe that he is expected to spend the rest of his life in an
institution for the profoundly retarded. See id. at 193.
313. Id. at 191.
314. See id. at 196.
315. See Amar & Widawsky, supra note 3, at 1381-82.
316. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (holding that "the
amendment is not a mere prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding slavery, but
an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of
the United States").
317. See Amar & Widawsky, supra note 3, at 1381-82.
318. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, § 1.
319. See Amar & Widawsky, supra note 3, at 1364.
320. See id.
321. See id. at 1384.
322. Id.
442
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horribles of government liability might be unleashed. '3n The Fourteenth
Amendment, according to the DeShaney Court, imposes a duty on the
states to assume responsibility for their citizens' safety and well-being
only when the states take citizens into custody and hold them against
their will.324 After the DeShaney decision, only people in state custody
have the right to raise a substantive due process claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 32 In this manner, the Court prevented citizens
from bringing suit against the government for every private wrong. 6
The Thirteenth Amendment would not result in a similar flood of
litigation. Unlike the sweeping nature of the Due Process Clause, which
applies to all denials of life, liberty, or property, the Thirteenth
Amendment only applies to involuntary servitude, which applies in far
fewer cases.327 In recent years, the Supreme Court Justices have often
323. Id. at 1363.
324. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189,
201 n.9 (1989).
325. See James T. R. Jones, Battered Spouses' Section 1983 Damage Actions
Against the Unresponsive Police After DeShaney, 93 W. VA. L. REv. 251, 295 (1990).
A possible argument that the garment workers, especially the ones held captive in El
Monte, could adopt is that the government put them in a dangerous predicament and,
therefore, they were de facto in state custody. The Supreme Court has not indicated how
it would rule in such a case. In Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980), the Court
avoided the question of whether a non-custodial relationship could ever result in a
substantive due process claim. Instead, the Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal on
the narrower grounds that the casual connection between the release of a parolee and a
murderer was too weak to establish a claim for deprivation of constitutional rights under
§ 1983. See id. at 285. However, several courts have interpreted the Court's decision as
authorizing a substantive due process action when a special relationship exists. See, e.g.,
Jones, supra at 263-64.
The Ninth Circuit revealed its liberal reading of the DeShaney opinion in Wood v.
Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). In that case,
the court construed the DeShaney custody requirement in a "special danger" situation
and found that a duty can arise in a non-custodial setting. In Wood, a Washington state
trooper stopped a car in which the plaintiff was a passenger. He arrested the driver and
impounded the car, leaving the plaintiff on the side of the road, in a dangerous area, at
2:30 a.m. The plaintiff was later raped. The court held that the actions of the police
officer created a "special danger," which was enough to satisfy the DeShaney custody
requirement. Jones, supra at 303. Therefore, an additional argument could be made that
by falling to seek a search warrant in the El Monte case, the federal government put the
women in a dangerous situation and, thus, assumed liability for their subsequent injuries.
326. The dissent in DeShaney, of course, does not agree that a flood of litigation
would be unleashed by finding the county liable under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Rather, Justice Brennan articulated that the Wisconsin child protection statutes created
an obligation upon the state to protect Joshua, which was constitutionally enforceable.
See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 208-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
327. See Amar & Widawsky, supra note 3, at 1365.
seemed wary of creating additional substantive due process rights.321
The Thirteenth Amendment comes with no such baggage. The
Thirteenth Amendment has "a stronger textual basis and a less tainted
doctrinal pedigree., 329 Its application would be strictly limited to cases
where the fact pattern reveals slave-like conditions. Thus, relief for an
individual under the Thirteenth Amendment would not "giveol a cause of
action against the state" to "victims of random street crime.
330
Amar and Widawsky have offered a compelling alternative to
litigation under the Fourteenth Amendment. Using the Thirteenth
Amendment's unique stature, as the sole amendment that outlaws
private as well as public conduct, plaintiffs can argue that the court
should place an additional burden on state and federal governments to
protect citizens from prohibited conduct by private parties. Unlike the
Fourteenth Amendment, which requires that litigants manipulate the
language of the amendment to find state action, the Thirteenth
Amendment prohibits the state from "turn[ing] a blind eye to de facto
slavery within its jurisdiction."33'
The argument that Amar and Widawsky make in relation to the
DeShaney case is more compelling when applied to the garment worker
case, and even more so when applied to the Thai garment workers in El
Monte. In making their argument, Amar and Widawsky had to
surmount the lack of economic profit involved in the so-called
enslavement of an abused child. Their argument that many instances of
slavery do not rely on financial incentives is, at best, unpersuasive.332
The reality of slavery is that it typically involves an individual laboring
for another's financial gain. The very terms, slavery and involuntary
servitude, imply service for another's benefit. Joshua provided no
service to his father. As Amar and Widawsky note, Joshua DeShaney
was treated only as a "punching bag";333 he served no other purpose in
his father's life.
Garment workers labor under far different circumstances. They slave
away, hour after hour, in order to make money for others, both the
sweatshop operator and the manufacturer. The garment workers are
clearly providing a service. Thus, arguing that the Thirteenth
328. In fact, the Court has recently narrowed the application of several previously
recognized substantive due process rights. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S.E. Penn. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (reducing the status of abortion rights from a
fundamental right to a protected liberty interest).
329. Akhil Reed Amar, Remember the Thirteenth, in 10 CONST. COMMENTARY 403,
406 (1993).
330. Amar & Widawsky, supra note 3, at 1385.
331. Id. at 1381.
332. See id. at 1370.
333. Id. at 1378.
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Amendment applies to their situation is much less of a stretch than
arguing that it applies to Joshua DeShaney. The legislative history of
the amendment clearly shows that it was intended to protect laborers. 3
In order to bring suit under the Thirteenth Amendment, by arguing
that it compels the government to intervene on behalf of the garment
workers, the plaintiffs need to show that the government knew about the
conditions in El Monte, but failed to intervene. The facts show that the
INS clearly had sufficient evidence to obtain a search warrant three
years before the state government intervened to free the women.33 In the
case of the El Monte garment workers, there is significant evidence that
the INS ignored clear signs that the apartment complex was a slave
camp. As California State Senator Richard Mountjoy said to an INS
representative at a state hearing on the raid, "It's astounding to me that
you had this information and you ignored it."336
William Slatterly, Executive Assistant Commissioner for INS Field
Operations, told the committee that the INS saw trucks delivering and
picking up garments and scraps and pieces of clothing, but no evidence
of people being held against their will.37 He insisted that the case had
been handled properly, stating that, "In 1992, I'm not sure I would have
done anything differently. ' 338 Despite Slatterly's protests to the contrary,
it is clear that the INS did have enough evidence in 1992. As Senator
Mountjoy noted at the hearings, they had a signed affidavit from an INS
agent, Richard Kee, which stated that he suspected a sweatshop was
housed in the complex; they saw the barbed wire surrounding the
334. According to Professor VanderVelde, the legislative history of the Thirteenth
Amendment reveals that "[b]y abolishing slavery and involuntary servitude, the framers
of the thirteenth amendment [sic] sought to advance both a floor of minimum rights for
all working men and an unobstructed sky of opportunities for their advancement."
VanderVelde, supra note 94, at 495. Much of the legislative history reveals that the
framers considered labor to be an intrinsic element of slavery. See supra Part In. Amar
and Widawsky define slavery in relation to its power dynamic only. They write that
slavery is "[a] power relation of domination, degradation, and subservience, in which
human beings are treated as chattel, not persons." Amar & Widawsky, supra note 3, at
1365. The legislative history does not confirm Amar and Widawsjky's hypothesis,
rather, it consistently talks about slavery in terms such as "degrad[ing] labor" and
indicates that the laborer has the "right to the fruits of his labor." VanderVelde, supra
note 94, at 472-73.
335. See Scheer, supra note 33, at B7.
336. INS Is Criticized for Ignoring California Garment Sweatshop, Cml. TRiB., Aug.
27, 1995, at 18 [hereinafter Cil. TRm.].
337. See id.
338. Stemgold, supra note 71, at A16.
complex and the agents never saw anyone coming or going.339 The
conclusion of most journalists and the State Senate committee was that
the INS was negligent in either failing to act in the face of evidence or
failing to put two and two together to ascertain that the complex was
something invidious. 4'
The INS claims that the U.S. Attorney's Office turned down a request
for a search warrant. The attorney, who admits turning down the
request, has stated that there was no probable cause.34' One article
questions why probable cause was not established given that not one
worker was ever seen leaving or entering the building during the three
months the complex was under surveillance. 4 2 The U.S. Attorney at the
time of the raid, Nora Manella, states in a letter to the Los Angeles Times
that there truly was insufficient evidence for a warrant, and "[n]o amount
of hindsight can alter the fact that an uncorroborated tip from an
anonymous informant, without independent evidence of criminal
activity, cannot justify a federal search warrant." 43 Ms. Manella states
that the U.S. Attorney's Office was simply respecting the Fourth
Amendment.? Even with the denial of the warrant, the INS could have
continued its investigation and again asked for a warrant. Instead, the
inquiry was dropped.
It was not until 1995 that the INS reopened the El Monte case when
yet another escapee came forward with her storyY5 Even after the INS
placed the complex under surveillance a second time, it failed to inform
the new agent, Phillip Bonner, that it had previously investigated the
complex. It was not until state officials were brought into the case that
the previous affidavit from Agent Kee was produced.?
Even after Bonner, an eight-year criminal investigator with the INS
347
documented his surveillance of the sweatshop in May and June of 1995,
the U.S. Attorney's Office did not receive copies of his memoranda? 4
In fact, the U.S. Attorney's Office was not informed about the results of
the surveillance until July 30, 1995, more than two months after Bonner
339. See CHI. TRm., supra note 336, at 18.
340. See supra notes 336-39 and accompanying text.
341. See Robert Scheer, So Many Questions, So Few Answers, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 20,
1995, at M5.
342. See id.
343. Letter from Nora M. Manella, Thai Sweatshop, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1995, at
B8.
344. See id.
345. See Shawn Hubler & George White, INS Accused of Blocking Probe of
Sweatshop Labor, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1995, at B1.
346. See Scheer, supra note 341, at M5.
347. See Hubler & White, supra note 345, at B1.
348. See Scheer, supra note 341, at M5.
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first began observing the complex. 9 Even when it received Bonner's
memoranda, instead of requesting a search warrant, the U.S. Attorney's
Office asked the state to delay its search of the premises."'
Bonner claimed that one of the reasons for the lack of action in the El
Monte case, despite sufficient evidence, was a personality conflict in the
INS office.35" ' Agent Bonner wrote a letter in August 1993 to Attorney
General Janet Reno, claiming that the management at the INS had
obstructed investigations into a criminal case in Los Angeles involving
"the smuggling of Asians and their peonage in Los Angeles." '352 He sent
similar letters to U.S. Senators Diane Feinstein and Barbara Boxer, but
no action was taken.353 Mr. Bonner claimed that the INS discriminated
against him because he spoke Thai and was married to a Thai woman.
He brought suit against the INS based on this alleged discrimination. 3"
Although Bonner's lawsuit may cast a shadow on his claims, there is no
doubt that the several 1995 affidavits he wrote urged federal officials to
raid the shop.355 As Bonner's attorney, David L. Ross, commented,
"[The INS killed this investigation.... They stopped him from
exposing slavery. '356 Even with the myriad of delays, Bonner became
349. See id.
350. See id.
351. See Sterngold, supra note 71, at A16.
352. Scheer, supra note 341, at M5; see also Hubler & White, supra note 345, at
B1.
353. See Scheer, supra note 341, at M5.
354. See Hubler & White, .upra note 345, at B 1.
355. See Stemgold, supra note 71, at A16.
356. Hubler & White, supra note 345, at B1. Governor Pete Wilson, then a
candidate for President, called for a Justice Department investigation of the federal
government's actions in failing to liberate the women of El Monte. He asked that
Attorney General Reno investigate the "inaction and apparent indifference" of the INS
and the Los Angeles U.S. Attorney's Office. Wilson Slams Delays in Raid on
Sweatshop, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 25, 1998, at A5. Wilson noted that the INS had
"detailed knowledge of the slavery operation" and that an agent had notified Reno
directly. Id. (seeming to be a reference to Agent Bonner's letter to Attorney General
Reno). Wilson added in his letter that the lack of action by the federal government was"unspeakable, and raises serious questions as to the federal government's ability to carry
out its responsibilities in a manner that is fair and equitable to all citizens." Id.
Despite his condemnation of the Justice Department, Governor Wilson twice vetoed
bills that would have held big manufacturers responsible for monitoring their
subcontractors' compliance with labor and immigration laws. See Stemgold, supra note
71, at A16. He felt that such legislation would drive the lucrative garment industry out
of the state. See id.
In addition to Governor Wilson's complaints about the lack of federal action, the El
Monte City Council sent a letter to President Clinton and Attorney General Reno saying
that residents were "extremely angry, bewildered, disappointed and discouraged with the
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one of the government's chief witnesses in the criminal prosecution
against the sweatshop owners.357
El Monte is not the only instance of the INS ignoring the indentured
servitude of illegal immigrants. In New York's Chinatown, located near
the INS regional headquarters, thousands of illegal immigrants labor in
garment factories. 58 Although Department of Labor inspectors often
come to the factories and issue citations, the INS never visits the
shops."59 The INS spends millions upon millions of dollars guarding the
border between Mexico and the United States, yet it spends almost no
time investigating employers? 6° Despite the fact that it is well known
that half of the illegal immigrants who enter the United States do so
legally and simply overstay their visas,36' there are fifteen times as many
border guards as there are workplace agents
3 2
According to a study conducted by the San Francisco Chronicle, the
INS often fails to use one of its most powerful tools-sanctions against
employers.363  After examining 300 pages of INS documents, the
Chronicle discovered that fewer than half of the 12,700 employer cases
reported to the INS from 1989 to 1994 resulted in fines. When fines
were assessed against the employers, the average was $1,612 per
offense. Many companies were able to negotiate their penalties from
thousands of dollars down to nothing.3 4
The decentralized organization of the INS has resulted in some bizarre
statistics. For example, despite the relatively modest amount of
immigrants in Cleveland, the local INS collected more than double the
fines collected in the immigration mecca of San Francisco.
36
Additionally, INS officials in Nebraska issued more citations than INS
officials in Fresno, California, a hub of the migrant farm worker
population.366 The Chronicle notes that the Los Angeles INS, which was
in charge of the El Monte investigation, has been "historically lax in
enforcing the employer sanctions law."367 They note that there is little
doubt that there are more illegal immigrants working in Los Angeles
federal response to reports of the sweatshop's existence." Hubler & White, supra note
345, at B 1.
357. See Kenneth B. Noble, Growing Vulnerability of Immigrants in the US, NEW
STRArrS T MEs PREss, Aug. 5, 1995, at 12.
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than anywhere in the country. Despite the vast number of violations
which occur there, the INS has collected more fines in small towns, such
as Laredo, Texas, than in the entire city of Los Angeles.36
In the last few years, the INS has cut back its enforcement efforts
against employers. Between 1989 and 1994, the INS eliminated more
than half the agents assigned to workplace surveillance, even in the face
of GAO reports that there were 36,000 outstanding leads that needed
follow-up.36  Accordingly, the number of workplace investigations
declined from 14,706 in 1989 to 5,963 in 1995.370 All of this occurred in
the face of escalating condemnation against illegal immigrants
themselves.
It is clear that the INS's lack of action in the El Monte case had tragic
results. The INS had significant evidence that for over three years the El
Monte sweatshop owners held women in captivity, and yet authorities
did not come to their rescue. Obviously, society needs to make the
government feel more obligated to its constituents. This Article
proposes that one strategy to effect this change is to encourage arguably
enslaved garment workers to bring suit under the Thirteenth
Amendment. As noted above, a suit directly under the Thirteenth
Amendment is grounded in precedent. There is no reason to believe, as
there was in the DeShaney case, that the Court would want to shy away
from this sort of affirmative duty. However, in order to bring suit
against the federal government, one must overcome significant hurdles.
These are discussed below.
1. Immunity
The federal government is protected against lawsuits by its citizenry
under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Unless the federal
government expressly grants an exception to that doctrine, citizens
cannot bring suit. As Chief Justice Marshall noted in the early days of
the Court, "The universally received opinion is that no suit can be
commenced or prosecuted against the United States. 371  Therefore,
potential plaintiffs often bring suit against individual agency officials to





371. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,411-412 (1821).
then indemnifies the officers so that they suffer no financial penalties
themselves.
In Bivens, the Supreme Court authorized a civil suit directly under the
Fourth Amendment against agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics for
money damages.372 Therefore, the correct course of action for garment
workers is to sue the director of the INS and the local management in
Los Angeles.
Even if the court finds that there is a cause of action under the
Thirteenth Amendment to sue government officials, the officials can still
raise the defense of immunity. Government officials are entitled to
qualified immunity373 for performing, or in this case, failing to perform a
discretionary function, unless their actions "violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known."374
In order to maintain an action against an INS official, the garment
workers would need to prove that the agent's conduct clearly violated
the workers' Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from involuntary
servitude. In light of the extensive evidence that the INS compiled on
the El Monte factory, it seems that an enslaved garment worker can
make a plausible claim. The agents had a clear directive under the
unforgiving language of the Thirteenth Amendment, that slavery "shall"
not exist, knew that there was, at the very least, strong evidence that
slavery was ongoing, and failed to prevent it. Under the above
reasoning, the INS agents are not entitled to immunity for failing to
prevent a clear constitutional violation.
A similar suit against the U.S. Attorney's Office would be almost
impossible to maintain. Prosecutors are generally entitled to absolute
immunity.3" In the case of Burns v. Reed,376 the plaintiff-suspect sued a
prosecutor for his participation in investigating the plaintiff-suspect,
securing an arrest warrant, and aiding in the plaintiff's four-month
confinement in a mental hospital. The Burns court found that the
prosecutor did not have absolute immunity for his investigative acts, but
did have absolute immunity for securing the arrest warrant.3" The
Assistant U.S. Attorney failed in the El Monte case to issue a search
warrant in the face of substantial evidence. It is unclear whether asking
372. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 389 (1971).
373. This is an affirmative defense. If the defendant fails to invoke it, the defendant
waives the defense.
374. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
375. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
376. 500U.S.478 (1991).
377. See id.
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for a search warrant is an act within the prosecutor's discretion or
whether it represents an investigative act. If the court determines the act
to be an investigative act, there is a chance that garment workers
similarly situated to those in the El Monte case could bring suit against
the U.S. Attorney as well.
2. Civil Rights Statutes
In addition to suing the federal government directly under the
Thirteenth Amendment, a claim should also be brought using the civil
rights enabling statutes. Unfortunately, a § 1985(3) suit would be as
difficult to win against the government as it would be against the
manufacturer. In Peck v. United States,"8 for example, the court
precluded a suit against a federal agent that was brought under §
1985(3)?3 Although the federal agent had knowledge of an alleged
agreement between vigilante groups and local law enforcement to permit
an assault of the freedom riders, the court found that the facts were
insufficient to support a claim of conspiracy. ° The court held that
"[m]ere knowledge... is insufficient to sustain a claim of conspiracy
under [§] 1985(3)." 3"1 The plaintiff in the freedom rider case did find a
way in which to hold the federal agent liable. Whereas the court found
that the strict definition of conspiracy contained in § 1985(3) did not
apply to the facts of the case,3 2 the court held that the plaintiffs were
entitled to relief under § 1986.383 The court declared that they were
entitled to relief because the federal agents failed to prevent a conspiracy
of which they had knowledgeY.3  The conspiracy between the vigilante
groups and the sheriffs to attack the freedom riders was held to
constitute a conspiracy under § 1985(3); the FBI's knowledge of this
conspiracy and lack of action to stop it was held sufficient to maintain a
§ 1986 claim.
3
The plaintiffs in the El Monte suit could convincingly argue that the
INS had knowledge of the conspiracy that existed amongst the
378. 470 F. Supp. 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
379. See id. at 1012.
380. See id.
381. Id. at 1012 (quoting Byrd v. Local Union No. 24, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,




385. See id. at 1016.
sweatshop employees. They had documented the conditions in various
affidavits and monitored the complex for months. It is clear that the
evidence they had collected was sufficient to warrant taking action to
prevent further civil rights violations. Despite this conclusive evidence,
the INS did not even participate in the raid that eventually freed the
enslaved workers. Rather, it was the state, acting on even less evidence,
that finally ended the conspiracy. Therefore, the court could hold the
INS liable under § 1986.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article develops a three-part litigation strategy that would allow
enslaved garment workers to seek restitution and vindication for their
pain, while at the same time providing incentives for manufacturers and
the government to monitor sweatshops to avoid creating more victims.
The three-part strategy targets the sweatshops, manufacturers, and
government in an attempt to bring all parties into compliance with the
law.
Garment workers are a highly vulnerable group. Largely immigrant,
their fear of deportation makes them especially susceptible to the more
sophisticated sweatshop owners. Their lack of resources and limited
knowledge of the English language and American legal system makes
the possibility of their seeking legal counsel very slim. It is for this
reason that legal practitioners and scholars need to devise a legal penalty
so severe that it will deter sweatshops altogether. If the courts impose
significant penalties on the manufacturer for contracting with the
sweatshops and on the government for failing to prevent slavery,
garment industry slavery will be practically eliminated. The risks will
simply be too high.
Therefore, legal practitioners need to put the three-part litigation
strategy to the test. Cases in which the manufacturer is forced to pay for
contracting with an illegal sweatshop, and the government is penalized
for failing to act when presented with evidence of slavery, would serve
as ideal test cases. Once a legal right to sue has been established, the
manufacturer would have every incentive to investigate their contractors
thoroughly and the government would have every incentive to initiate
investigations. While holding the sweatshops liable is a necessary
component of a suit against the manufacturers and the government, it
cannot reasonably be expected that any deterrence will occur from this
action alone. After all, the majority of sweatshops are judgment proof.
This strategy is largely attractive because of its deterrence benefits.
The reality of garment workers is that by coming forward they not only
risk losing their job, they also risk being deported. For many garment
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workers this is reason enough to stay quiet3 6  By deterring the
manufacturer from contracting with sweatshops and encouraging the
government to beef-up investigations, the garment worker would be able
to enjoy a better work environment without having to fear indentured
servitude.
386. A potential down side to this litigation strategy is that it may result in more
international contracts, as contractors seek to avoid greater liability for wrongful
employment practices in the United States. The discussion of this outcome is beyond the
scope of this Article.
(9)
